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ABSTRACT 
In 1987 the United States agreed to register eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers under the 
American flag and provide them naval protection at the height of the Iran – Iraq War.  
Motivated primarily by Cold War considerations, the United States embarked on a policy 
of “neutral intervention” whose intended effects were certain to be disadvantageous to 
Iran.  American planners failed to adequately anticipate Iranian reaction to the American 
policy, which led to a number of violent naval actions and American retaliatory strikes on 
Iranian oil facilities.  Nevertheless, by April 1988, the United States had largely achieved 
its declared objectives, which were to secure the safe transit of Kuwaiti oil through the 
Gulf, and forestall the expansion of Soviet influence in the region.  On April 29, 1988, 
however, the United States expanded the scope of the protection scheme, extending the 
U.S. Navy’s protective umbrella to all neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf.  This decision 
divorced the American policy from its original limited objectives, increased the 
likelihood of further confrontation with Iran, and laid the groundwork for the destruction 
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This thesis examines the Reagan Administration’s 1987 decision to register 
eleven Kuwaiti-owned oil tankers under the American flag and provide them with naval 
escort through the Persian Gulf during the height of the Iran – Iraq war.  The objective is 
to provide an analysis of the American policy as an example of what has traditionally 
been called “gunboat diplomacy,” which James Cable has defined, in his influential 
study, as “the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in 
order to secure advantage or avert loss, either in furtherance of an international dispute or 
against foreign nationals within the territory of jurisdiction of their own state.”1   
 On January 23, 1980, President Carter promulgated the Carter Doctrine when he 
declared that any attempt by an outside power to gain control of the Persian Gulf would 
“be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such 
an assault will be repelled by all means necessary, including military force.”2  This 
declaration was made in the shadow of the threats to American interests in the Persian 
Gulf posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution.  To support 
this doctrine, the Carter Administration took several concrete steps leading to future 
American military intervention in the Persian Gulf.3  Every subsequent American 
President, regardless of party, has adhered to the principles espoused by the Carter 
Doctrine.   
On September 23, 1980, Iraqi forces crossed the border into neighboring Iran 
commencing a war that was to last eight years.  The following day President Carter 
warned both countries that “it is imperative that there be no infringement of that freedom 
                                                 
1 James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919 – 1991 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 14.  
Henceforth referred to as Gunboat Diplomacy. 
2 The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, “State of the Union Address, 1980,” 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml. 
3 Cecil B. Crabb, The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy Their Meaning, Role, and Future (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 329.  Henceforth referred to as Doctrines.  These steps 
included the creation of a Middle East Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), increased military spending, and 
renewal of an earlier pledge to defend Pakistan.  The United States Navy witnessed its Persian Gulf on-
station time expand threefold between 1979 and 1980. 
2 
of passage of ships to and from the Persian Gulf region.”4  Three weeks later Secretary of 
State Muskie affirmed that the United States had “pledged to do what is necessary to 
protect free shipping in the Strait of Hormuz from any interference.”5  Seven years later 
the United States was called upon to make good this pledge.   
Operation Earnest Will was a seminal event in the history of American 
involvement in the Persian Gulf.  It marked the first time military force was called upon 
to support the Carter Doctrine.  It denoted the passage of responsibility for Persian Gulf 
Security from Great Britain to the United States and commenced an era of continuous 
U.S. Navy presence in the region that has extended up to today.     
B. IMPORTANCE  
The United States, a declared neutral party to the conflict, commenced the 
operation in July 1987, with the limited objective of protecting U.S. flag merchant vessels 
from attack.  The Reagan Administration considered the threat to American forces to be 
low under the assumption that Iranian forces would be reluctant to attack American-
flagged vessels.  The Reagan Administration was vehement in its assertion that the 
United States was not undertaking the operation to protect all neutral merchant shipping.  
However, after ten months and five Iranian – American naval clashes, the United States 
expanded the protection scheme to include all non-belligerent merchant shipping.6  The 
April 1988 decision to expand the scope of the protection scheme resulted in an 
aggressive naval posture which culminated in the destruction of Iran Air flight 655 by the 
USS Vincennes (CG-49) on July 3, 1988.  Ironically, this tragedy provided the Iranian 
government with the diplomatic cover required to end the war and demonstrates the 
unintended consequences that are so often associated with military escalation.  
Most analyses of Operation Earnest Will consider the American effort to be a 
success.  Indeed, by April 1988, the United States had largely achieved all the objectives 
set forth by the Reagan Administration in June 1987.  However, the perceived success of 
                                                 
4 Michael A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian 
Gulf, 1883 – 1992 (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 109.  Henceforth referred to as Guardians. 
5 Ibid. 
6 To be precise, the scheme was expanded to all non-belligerent shipping not carrying contraband 
material or resisting legitimate search and seizure by a belligerent under attack outside of declared 
exclusion zones. 
3 
Operation Earnest Will has masked critical errors committed by American planners in 
formulating the operation.  An analysis of Operation Earnest Will as a policy of gunboat 
diplomacy reveals that the United States failed to adequately consider factors which 
influenced Iranian response to the provocative American policy.   
Operation Earnest Will depended for its success upon Tehran choosing to 
terminate its attacks on Kuwaiti-owned vessels and, after April 1988, all neutral shipping 
transiting the Persian Gulf.  Such a decision in turn depended upon a number of factors, 
including the political outlook of the Iranian government, the effectiveness of its 
administrative authority, the nature of its political support, and the way in which Iran’s 
prior experiences with the United States conditioned its expectations of American 
behavior.  These factors, which are by no means easy to understand, were not carefully 
considered by American planners, resulting in rather complacent assumptions about the 
likely Iranian response to Operation Earnest Will.  The April 1988 decision to expand the 
protection scheme to include all neutral shipping built upon these initial errors by 
divorcing American policy from the limited objectives set forth in June 1987 and 
increased the likelihood of more direct Iranian – American clashes in the Persian Gulf.   
Greater efforts by American planners to understand the dynamics of post-
revolutionary Iranian domestic politics, including the importance of the Iran – Iraq war to 
the Iranian regime, the significance of Tehran’s use of Shi’a symbology to describe the 
conflict, and Iranian perceptions of the United States as its ultimate nemesis in the region, 
if not the world, could have lead to less optimistic assumptions with respect to Iran’s 
acceptance of Operation Earnest Will.  Doubtless the operation would have proceeded, 
but a more thorough analysis of Iranian incentives in confronting the United States would 
have resulted in planners deducing more realistic expectations regarding the potential for 
escalation.  Better assumptions would have facilitated more informed risk management 
and greater appreciation of the dangers and cost of becoming directly involved in the Iran 
– Iraq conflict. 
The April 1988 decision to expand the protection scheme “lowered the threshold 
of crisis”7 and set the United States Navy on a course towards direct confrontation with 
Iran.  Closer adherence to traditional principles of gunboat diplomacy, in which                                                  
7 Janice Gross-Stein, “The Wrong Strategy in the Right Place,” International Security 13, no. 3 (1988), 
http://links.jstor.org, 156 (accessed May 2, 2006). 
4 
limitations on risk are a paramount concern, would have revealed the danger of the 
United States becoming a belligerent in the Iran – Iraq War and may have given pause to 
those advocating more direct American involvement in the Persian Gulf.   
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis begins with a study of the Carter Doctrine and an historical review of 
American naval operations in the Persian Gulf between 1945 and 1981.  An examination 
of the “Tanker War” focused on the period between 1981 to 1986 provides the context 
surrounding the 1987 Kuwaiti request to register eleven vessels under the American flag.   
The Reagan Administration’s strategic objectives in complying with the Kuwaiti request 
are closely examined.  A discussion of gunboat diplomacy as a concept provides a 
framework for a critical examination of the American operation.  A detailed description 
of the first nine months of the operation, to include the military clashes between the 
United States and Iran during this period, provides the concrete historical context in 
which the April 1988 decision to expand the protection scheme was reached.  American 
objectives in expanding the protection scheme will be detailed.  Finally, the consequences 
of the April 1988 decision to expand the scope of maritime protection will be discussed 
within the context of gunboat diplomacy 
The preponderance of existing literature concerning Operation Earnest Will 
considers the American effort in the Persian Gulf to be a success.  Walker,8 Politakis,9 
and De Guttry10 approach the operation from a legal standpoint.  Palmer provides a 
detailed history of United States Navy operations in the Persian Gulf until 1992.11  
Navias and Hooton discuss Operation Earnest Will within the context of the Tanker  
 
                                                 
8 George K. Walker, The Tanker War, 1980 – 88: Law And Policy (Newport: United States Naval War 
College, 2000). 
9 George P. Politakis, Modern Aspects of the Laws of Naval Warfare and Maritime Neutrality 
(London: Keegan Paul International, 1998).  Henceforth referred to as Maritime Neutrality. 
10 Andrea DeGuttry and Natalino Ronzitti, eds., The Iran – Iraq War (1980 – 1988) and the Law of 
Naval Warfare (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited, 1993).  Henceforth referred to as Law of Naval 
Warfare. 
11 Palmer, Guardians. 
5 
War.12  Cordesman13 and Crist14 provide detailed histories of the Iran – Iraq war and 
Operation Earnest Will respectively.  Karsh15 and Joyner16 provide detailed descriptions 
of American objectives in reflagging the Kuwaiti tankers.   
 The April 1988, expansion of the protection scheme elicited no strong debate or 
Congressional hearings of any kind.  McNaugher attributes this shift in American policy 
to pressure from the Kuwaitis to exert more effort against the Iranians and also due to the 
frustration of American naval officers who had to watch helplessly as neutral merchant 
shipping was attacked by Iran.17  O’Rourke contends, without providing supporting 
documentation, that the Reagan Administration had been receiving pressure to expand the 
protection scheme from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and American ship 
owners operating vessels under foreign flags as well as frustrated naval officers.18  
Johnson attributes the lack of Congressional response to the American escalation as being 
due to “the victorious euphoria that was pervasive in Washington” following Operation 
Praying Mantis.19  Crist asserts that the decision was made in order to increase pressure 
on the Iranian military.20  No source critically examines Operation Earnest Will as an 
example of Gunboat Diplomacy. 
                                                 
12 Martin S. Navias and E.R. Hooton, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During the 
Iran – Iraq Crisis, 1980 – 1988 (New York: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd, 1996).  Henceforth referred to as 
Tanker Wars. 
13 Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War Volume II (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990).  Henceforth referred to as Lessons. 
14 David B. Crist, “Operation Earnest Will” (PhD diss, The Florida State University, 1998). 
15 Efraim Karsh, ed., The Iran – Iraq War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989). 
16 Christopher C. Joyner, ed., The Persian Gulf War (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990). 
17 Efraim Karsh, ed., The Iran – Iraq War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 191, 193. 
18 Ronald O’Rourke, “Gulf Ops,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 115 (May 1989), 47. 
19 Christopher C. Joyner, ed., The Persian Gulf War (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 135. 
20 David B. Crist, e-mail message to author, August 29, 2006. 
6 
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE  
Chapter I discusses the purpose and importance of the thesis.  A description of the 
research methodology and major sources used in the thesis follows.  A review of existing 
literature introduces the reader to the major sources influencing the thesis’s central 
argument.   
Chapter II focuses on American involvement in the Middle East prior to the Iran – 
Iraq War.  A discussion of the Carter Doctrine sets Operation Earnest Will within a 
strategic context.  The chapter examines United States Navy involvement in the Persian 
Gulf between 1945 and 1981 and demonstrates the limited involvement of the United 
States Navy in the Persian Gulf prior to 1987.   
Chapter III provides an overview of the first six years of the Iran – Iraq War with 
emphasis on the role of the Tanker War in the strategies of both belligerents.  Careful 
study of the ferocity of shipping attacks and the attack methods employed by the 
belligerents provides critical background to understanding the circumstances surrounding 
the Kuwaiti government’s approach to the United States in December 1986.  An 
investigation of the U.S. Navy’s presence in the Persian Gulf between 1981 and 1986 
provides a historical link between the prewar American naval presence in the region and 
Operation Earnest Will.  
Chapter IV centers on the January 1987 Kuwaiti request to register eleven vessels 
under the American flag and the American response to same.  As the Soviet Union 
weighed heavily in the United States agreeing to the Kuwaiti request, a short discussion 
of Kuwaiti foreign policy vis-à-vis the superpowers is necessary.  An examination of the 
objectives of Operation Earnest Will follows.  A brief description of the USS Stark 
incident is necessary, as this “mistaken” Iraqi attack resulted in increased Congressional 
focus on the Reagan Administration’s reflagging scheme.   A discussion of gunboat 
diplomacy provides the analytical framework within which American planning 
assumptions regarding the anticipated Iranian response to the American operation is 
critiqued. 
7 
Chapter V looks at the first nine months of Operation Earnest Will.  The chapter 
discusses the five major American – Iranian military clashes that occurred during this 
period, setting the background for the April 1988 decision to expand the American 
protection scheme to cover all neutral shipping.  
Chapter VI starts with a discussion of the April 1988 decision to expand the 
United States Navy’s protective umbrella to all neutral merchant vessels.  A second 
discussion of gunboat diplomacy reveals the dangers of increased American involvement 
in the Iran – Iraq war that resulted from the divorcing of Operation Earnest Will from its 
initial limited objectives.  A direct correlation exists between this decision and the July 3, 
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II. THE ROOTS OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT 
A.  CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
American foreign policy towards the Middle East changed dramatically in the 
period between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Iran – Iraq 
War in September 1980.  The principle of containment espoused by the Truman Doctrine 
laid the foundation for the more aggressive postures mandated by the Eisenhower and 
Carter Doctrines, both of which authorized the use of military force to defend American 
interests in the Middle East.  This period also witnessed the beginning of American naval 
involvement in the Persian Gulf, a development that gained increased importance 
following the 1971 withdrawal of major British forces from the region and the failure of 
the Twin Pillars strategy in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. 
B. THE CARTER DOCTRINE 
Development of American foreign policy vis-à-vis the Middle East was impacted 
more by Cold War concerns than the global oil market in the immediate aftermath of 
World War II.21  By the late 1940s, however, Persian Gulf oil played an increasingly 
large role in forming American attitudes towards the region.  The oil scare of 1948 
spotlighted the fact that domestic oil reserves were declining, as was the American share 
of the world oil export market.  Additionally, by 1947, the United States Navy was often 
turning towards Middle East sources to meet its fuel requirements.  Between 1946 and 
1950, 30 to 42 percent “of the petroleum products moved by the U.S. Navy came from 
the Persian Gulf.”22  
The growing importance of the Persian Gulf region was recognized by the 
Truman Administration in October 1949, through the adoption of NSC 47/2.  NSC 47/2 
identified three major strategic objectives: to promote ties between regional and western 
governments; to preclude Soviet expansion into the region; and to prevent regional 
disputes from undermining the ability of Middle Eastern states to resist Soviet 
                                                 
21 Palmer, Guardians, 41. 
22 Ibid., 45. 
10 
aggression.23  NSC 47/2 was a natural outgrowth of the Truman Doctrine.  Elucidated by 
President Truman to a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, the Truman Doctrine 
set the idea of containment as the “integrating principle of American diplomacy towards 
the Soviet Union, towards Western Europe and towards the Middle East.”24  President 
Truman envisioned American assistance to foreign governments to be primarily 
economic and financial in nature, which he considered “essential to economic stability 
and orderly political processes.”25  The Truman Doctrine established the basis by which 
the increasingly interventionist Eisenhower and Carter Doctrines pledged the 
commitment of American military forces to the defense of the Middle East against Soviet 
efforts to establish hegemony over this strategically vital area of the world. 
By the mid 1950s, the American position in the Middle East appeared to be 
deteriorating.  The combined British – French – Israeli invasion of Egypt in October, 
1956, in response to Gamal abd al-Nasser’s July 26 nationalization of the Suez Canal, 
substantially weakened the West’s standing in the Middle East.   Additionally, the United 
States had withdrawn its offer of financial support for Egypt’s construction of the Aswan 
High Dam on July 19, causing Nasser to look towards the Soviet Union for funding.  The 
Soviets took advantage of the American missteps to increase their influence in the Middle 
East, agreeing in October 1958 to finance the Aswan Dam project.  The combination of 
increased communist influence coupled with Nasser’s Arab socialism, which many 
within the Eisenhower Administration equated with communism,26 was a cause of great 
concern within the halls of American government. 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed the issue of increasing communist 
leverage in the Middle East in a January 5, 1957, Congressional address.  President 
Eisenhower recognized the instability that was gripping the Middle East, attributing the 
poor state of affairs directly to the Soviet Union and International Communism.  The 
President asserted that “the integrity and independence of the nations of the Middle East 
                                                 
23 David B. Crist, “Operation Earnest Will,” 25. 
24 Crabb, Doctrines, 139.  
25 The Harry S. Truman Presidential Museum and Library, “Special Message to the Congress on 
Greece and Turkey,” http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2189&st=truman+doctrine&st1= 
(accessed May 11, 2006).  Henceforth referred to as “Truman Doctrine.” 
26 Crabb, Doctrines, 162. 
11 
should be inviolate” and that the great responsibility of ensuring the sovereignty of this 
critical area rested with the United States.27 
The proposed legislation, soon to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, was 
“primarily designed to deal with the possibility of communist aggression, direct and 
indirect.”28  To meet the communist threat, the Eisenhower Doctrine relied on a three-
pronged strategy to assist “moderate” Middle East governments.29  First, President 
Eisenhower requested authority to commence new foreign aid programs designed to 
assist Middle Eastern nations “in the development of economic strength dedicated to the 
maintenance of national independence.”30  Second, the proposed legislation called for the 
provision of American military aid to friendly Middle East governments requesting such 
aid.  Third, and most importantly, President Eisenhower requested authorization for “such 
assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United 
States (emphasis added), to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political 
independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from 
any nation controlled by International Communism.”31 
The provision of economic and military aid as a tool to contain the expansion of 
communism was very much in line with the concepts espoused in the Truman Doctrine.  
However, the Eisenhower Doctrine broke new ground by opening up the possibility that 
American military forces could be introduced into the region to protect the sovereignty of 
Middle Eastern states.  This was problematic, in that the issue of what exactly comprised 
communist aggression needed to be clarified.  The Eisenhower Administration appeared 
reconciled to the acceptance of Middle Eastern communist governments that obtained 
power peacefully but would react to an outright invasion by a communist country (direct 
aggression) or foreign-sponsored communist guerilla activity, subversion, or propaganda 
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campaigns (indirect aggression).32  Also important to note is that the Eisenhower 
Doctrine prescribed the deployment of American forces to the region only at the 
invitation of a Middle East government.  Twenty three years later, under the precepts of 
the Carter Doctrine requests for American military intervention would not be required in 
the event of direct Soviet aggression.  A modified version of the Eisenhower Doctrine 
was approved in the Senate by a vote of 72 for and 19 against on March 5, 1957.33  
President Eisenhower signed the resolution into law on March 9. 
Sixteen months later, the American military was called on to uphold the 
Eisenhower Doctrine during the Lebanese Civil War.  The Lebanese Civil War erupted in 
the aftermath of Maronite Christian president Camille Chamoun’s attempt to amend the 
nation’s constitution to allow him to run for reelection.  Syria and Egypt provided support 
for various groups opposing Chamoun, while the Lebanese president appealed to the 
United States for assistance.  President Eisenhower, despite a conviction that 
Communism was at the root of the unrest in Lebanon, did not immediately intervene.34  
The July 14 Iraqi revolution, which toppled the West-leaning King Faysal II, shocked the 
Eisenhower Administration and ultimately lead to the United States answering 
Chamoun’s call for assistance.  The United States Marines landed in Lebanon on July 15, 
1958.  While the landing of the Marines was probably unnecessary, as Chamoun had 
quietly announced that he would step down as President in September,35 the crisis in 
Lebanon had provided the Eisenhower Administration with an opportunity to 
demonstrate American resolve in confronting the menace of communism and, by doing 
so, prove that the United States could be a dependable ally to Middle East governments.  
Similar considerations played a large role in the American decision to embark on 
Operation Earnest Will.  
Despite the critical importance ascribed to the Middle East by the Truman and 
Eisenhower Doctrines, the United States had been content to cede responsibility for the 
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security of the Persian Gulf to the British.  The 1971 withdrawal of major British forces 
to a position east of the Suez Canal resulted in an American reevaluation of Gulf security.  
Alarmingly, the British withdrawal coincided with an increase in Soviet naval presence in 
the region.36  Additionally, American involvement in the Vietnam conflict had had left 
both the government and public opinion reluctant to assume additional military 
responsibilities around the globe.  These factors resulted in the Nixon Administration 
transferring the Vietnamization strategy to the Persian Gulf via military aid to Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, which became the “Twin Pillars” supporting American interests in the 
region. 
The Twin Pillars strategy unleashed a torrent of American military aid to Iran.  
Iranian defense expenditures jumped over five-fold between 1969 and 1978.37  The doors 
of the American military arsenal swung open to the Iranian Shah, allowing the purchase 
of advanced aircraft (the F-4 and F-14), sophisticated missiles (the Hawk surface-to-air 
missile), and high tech naval vessels (the Kouroosh i.e. Kidd class destroyer).  Despite 
these large military expenditures, the twin pillars strategy was not successful.  The 
Iranian arms buildup could not prevent the fall of Mohammed Reza Shah and merely 
served to provide the Islamic Republic of Iran a formidable military in the aftermath of 
the Iranian Revolution.  Additionally, as Palmer adroitly points out, the Iranian arms 
build up prompted expansion in the Iraqi military to counter the Persian threat.  This 
regional arms race helped fuel the drive towards the Iran – Iraq War and the 1991 Gulf 
War.38  
The Persian Gulf received renewed focus following the 1976 election of Jimmy 
Carter to the Presidency.  Building on a 1977 memorandum that identified the Persian 
Gulf as a region in which “greater military concern ought to be given,” the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff completed a review of regional American strategy that declared continuous access 
to Persian Gulf oil sources, and the prevention of a hostile power from establishing 
hegemony over the area, to be major American strategic objectives in the region.39 
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The Twin Pillars strategy espoused by the Nixon Administration was considerably 
weakened by the late 1970s.  The position of the Shah was becoming increasingly 
perilous as Iran moved from one crisis to another.  The Shah had encountered substantial 
Clerical opposition to the 1960s White Revolution, primarily from a junior cleric named 
Ruholla Khomeini.  Efforts undertaken to industrialize Iran in the 1960s, which resulted 
in increased urbanization and a marked decrease in agricultural output, largely failed.40  
Attempts during the 1970s to alleviate the crisis brought on by the failed 1960s 
industrialization policies through oil wealth also failed as funds were diverted to finance 
the Shah’s military build up as well as many “white elephant” projects.41  Income 
inequality generated by uneven distribution of oil wealth bred social resentment, which, 
when coupled with the Shah’s increasingly autocratic behavior, delegitimized the ruling 
regime in the eyes of much of the Iranian population. 
Events came to a head with the January 1978 publication in a state-run newspaper 
of an attack on Ayatollah Khomeini, who had been exiled since 1963.  Massive protests 
erupted in Qum, in which several students were killed by the Iranian army.  Increasingly 
violent protests erupted throughout Iran during the spring and summer of 1978.  Poor 
fiscal policy exacerbated the levels of social unrest, breeding more protests and the 
declaring of martial law.  The killing of hundreds of protestors by the Iranian military on 
September 8, 1978, known as “Black Friday”, sealed the Shah’s fate.  The Shah left Iran 
on January 16, 1979.  The Iranian pillar upon which the security of Persian Gulf rested 
had collapsed. 
The December 27, 1979, invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, coming so 
closely on the heels of the Shah’s fall, came as a further shock to the Carter 
Administration.  The occupation of Afghanistan placed the Soviet Army on the Iranian 
border in a position to threaten Gulf oil supplies.  The United States responded to the new 
security situation in the Persian Gulf on January 23, 1980, during the Presidential State of 
the Union Address through the announcement of what became known as the Carter 
Doctrine. 
                                                 




President Carter classified the Iranian hostage situation and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan as a “serious challenge to the United States of America and, indeed, to all 
the nations of the world.”42  The dangers posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
were described as “the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War.”43  
The American President acknowledged the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf to the 
West and was alarmed that Soviet forces were in a position to dominate the Indian Ocean 
and Strait of Hormuz, a danger which granted the Soviets a “strategic position” which 
posed “a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.”44  In response to this new 
threat to Western security, President Carter drew a line in the sand by stating that any 
“attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as 
an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will 
be repelled by all means necessary, including military force.”45 
To reinforce the Carter Doctrine, the United States accelerated deployments of 
military forces commenced in the wake of the Iranian Revolution.  The President called 
for additional military and economic aid for Pakistan, and drastically increased the 
United States Navy’s presence in the Indian Ocean.46  Additionally, the United States 
deployed four E-3 AWACS aircraft and three KC-135 tanker aircraft to Saudi Arabia to 
buttress the Kingdom’s air defense while simultaneously seeking to sell the Saudis 
additional sophisticated military equipment.47   
American foreign policy vis-à-vis the Middle East progressed remarkably in the 
period between the 1949 adoption of the Truman Doctrine, which elevated the notion of 
containing communism to paramount importance, through NSC 47/2, which transferred 
the principle of Soviet containment to the Middle East, and on to the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, which allowed for the possibility of direct American military involvement in 
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the event a Middle East government requested assistance to combat the Communist 
threat.  The Carter Doctrine went one step further by clearly delineating Persian Gulf 
security as a vital American interest which would be defended by military force, with or 
without an invitation from a Persian Gulf government.  Additionally, the Carter Doctrine 
marks the commencement of the period of American responsibility for Persian Gulf 
security in the wake of the 1971 withdrawal of the Royal Navy and the failure of the 
Nixon-era Twin Pillars strategy.  
C. THE U.S. NAVY IN THE PERSIAN GULF: A BRIEF HISTORY 
The United States Navy’s presence in the Persian Gulf reflected the American 
belief in the Royal Navy as the sine qua non for Persian Gulf security in the aftermath of 
the Second World War.  The position of the British in the Persian Gulf would erode 
throughout the late 1940s and into the 1950s and 60s, forcing a somewhat reluctant 
United States to establish a permanent naval presence in the Persian Gulf. 
The post-war genesis of American naval involvement in the Persian Gulf can be 
traced to the January 20, 1948, establishment of Task Force 126.  Initially comprised of 
tankers carrying Gulf oil to fuel other American naval vessels, Task Force 126 was 
renamed the Middle East Force (MEF) in August 1949.48  In 1948 the American naval 
presence in the Persian Gulf was enhanced by the visit of an aircraft carrier battlegroup.  
The introduction of this battlegroup served mainly as a “test flight” to determine if the 
United States Navy could effectively and efficiently operate in the Persian Gulf 
environment.  Additionally, the American task group worked closely with the Royal 
Navy and utilized British facilities in Bahrain in support of the large naval presence.49   
By 1951, the American naval posture in the Persian Gulf had stabilized to the 
small number of combatants assigned to the MEF.50 The Middle East Force represented a 
naval “presence” and could not be considered a plausible deterrent to the Soviet Union or 
other regional countries; Admiral William J. Crowe, who served as Chairman of the Joint 
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Chiefs of Staff during Operation Earnest Will and commanded the MEF in the mid-
1970s, referred to the small American force as a “showing the flag squadron.”51  The 
small American force was impacted by the Six Day War of 1967, when Bahrainis staged 
several demonstrations to protest American support for Israel. 
The 1971 withdrawal of the British from the Persian Gulf did not appreciably 
alter the small size of the Middle East Force.  The Americans secured basing rights from 
Bahrain, which provided the United States Navy with a base of operations for continued 
activity in the Gulf.  Throughout the mid to late 1970s, domestic political concerns lead 
to the Bahraini government seeking to terminate the U.S. Navy’s presence in the tiny 
country.  Following many months of negotiations, a de facto compromise was reached in 
which the United States drastically reduced its footprint in Bahrain by removing all 
American dependents from the island and limiting tours of duty for American servicemen 
to twelve months.  In their efforts to create the perception that the United States was 
maintaining an extremely small presence in Bahrain the American negotiators even 
managed to have the tiny kingdom reduce American rent from four to two million dollars 
a year.52 
The American naval presence in the Persian Gulf remained small until the 
commencement of Operation Earnest Will in 1987.53  As late as spring, 1978, Admiral 
Crowe considered the threat of regional war to be low and that the internal threat to the 
Shah was not serious, due to the effectiveness of the Shah’s “security mechanisms.”54  
The focus of the United States was fixed firmly on the Soviet Union.  Unfortunately, faith 
in Iran as the guarantor of Persian Gulf security would be shattered by the Iranian 
revolution.  The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan heightened Washington’s concern over 
the safety of the Persian Gulf.  While the number of vessels deployed in the Persian Gulf 
remained relatively constant, the United States tripled its presence in the Indian Ocean 
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between 1979 and 1980.55  By April 1980, the United States had deployed two aircraft 
carrier battlegroups and a Marine Amphibious Unit to the region, establishing an 
impressive armada of 37 warships, 22 of which were combatants.56  This force was 
reduced to one carrier battlegroup in October 1981, nine months following the resolution 
of the Iran Hostage Crisis, but thereafter American involvement continued at a similarly 
high level throughout the 1980s, reflecting the permanent change that taken place in 
America’s outlook toward the region. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
With the announcement of the Carter Doctrine, the United States had clearly 
articulated the importance of the Persian Gulf to the West and expressed the will of the 
American people to go to war to ensure the free flow of oil.  However, it would be the 
Iran – Iraq War, and not a Soviet invasion of countries bordering the Persian Gulf, that 
would provide the impetus for enforcing the Carter Doctrine.  While the menace of 
increased Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf impacted the American decision to invoke 
the Carter doctrine, the United States would find itself trading shots not with the Soviet 
Navy, but with Iran. 
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III. THE TANKER WAR: 1981 - 1986 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
On September 23, 1980, following a series of air strikes on Iranian airfields, the 
Iraqi army crossed the border into neighboring Iran, igniting a war that was to last nearly 
eight years.  The Iran – Iraq border had witnessed multiple border skirmishes in the 
months leading up to the war.  Additionally, insurgent groups conducted guerilla 
operations within Iran and Iraq with the full support and approval of Baghdad and 
Tehran.57  Diplomatic relations had already been severed the previous June.  Tensions 
along the Iran – Iraq border increased throughout the summer, culminating in a major 
clash at Qasr e-Sharin in early September.  Saddam Hussein reacted to the border 
skirmishes on September 17 declaring that “the frequent Iranian violations of Iraqi 
sovereignty have rendered the 1975 Algiers agreement null and void.”58 
The agreement to which Saddam referred was merely the most recent in a series 
of diplomatic efforts to regulate control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway.  Its governance 
had been a major source of friction between the two countries for generations, and was a 
major factor motivating the Iraqi decision to strike Iran.  A treaty concluded between the 
two nations in 1937 identified the low water mark on the eastern (Iranian) side of the 
waterway as the international border, effectively ceding control of the Shatt al-Arab to 
Iraq.59  Henceforth, vessels transiting the Shatt al-Arab were required to embark Iraqi 
pilots and fly the Iraqi flag.  In April 1969, however, Mohammed Reza Shah had 
abrogated the 1937 treaty and refused to pay the toll required for vessels transiting the 
waterway.  Iraq responded by threatening to block Iranian access to the Shatt al-Arab.  
Tensions increased on April 24, 1969, when Tehran provided naval escort to an Iranian 
merchant vessel navigating the disputed waterway.  Iranian support for Kurdish 
separatists in northern Iraq exacerbated the delicate situation.  Open combat erupted 
during the winter of 1973 – 1974.60 
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In an effort to avoid further hostilities, Iran and Iraq concluded the Algiers 
Agreement in March 1975.  The agreement set the border between the two countries at 
the center of the Shatt al-Arab, ceding control of 50 percent of the vital waterway to Iran 
and imperiling Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf.  Iranian control over half of the waterway 
threatened merchant traffic trading with the Iraqi port of Basra, Iraq’s principal dry cargo 
port located 60 kilometers from the mouth of the Shatt.61  Regaining complete control 
over the Shatt al-Arab waterway was an important strategic objective which helped push 
Saddam Hussein towards war with Iran.62       
On September 22, 1980, Iraqi aircraft ineffectively attacked six Iranian air bases 
and four army installations.63  These attacks were followed a day later by a four-pronged 
six-division ground invasion of Iran along a 400 mile front.  By September 28, Iraqi 
forces had secured Ahvaz in southwest Iran and announced its readiness to accept a 
ceasefire, an announcement which was repeated on October 5.  By October 24, Iraq had 
largely succeeded in achieving its territorial objectives and by December, Saddam 
Hussein announced that Iraq did not intend to pursue further large-scale offensive 
actions.64   
The war rapidly spilled over into the Persian Gulf.  Iran declared its coastal 
waterways a war zone, established new shipping lanes and identification procedures for 
vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and instituted a blockade of Iraqi ports on 
September 22.65  Iraq responded on October 7 by declaring the area of the Gulf north of 
latitude 29 degrees 30 minutes a “prohibited war zone.”  Maritime traffic along the 
disputed Shatt al Arab waterway ground to a halt, trapping at least 83 merchant vessels in 
the zone of hostilities.66  On December 24, 1980, Iraqi aircraft struck the main Iranian oil 
export terminal at Kharg Island.   
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B. IRAQI OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY 
Baghdad viewed the Iran – Iraq conflict as a “limited war.”  Saddam Hussein did 
not intend to conquer Iran.  Iraq embarked on the war in order to secure limited territorial 
and political objectives.  Saddam feared the spread of the Iranian Revolution into Iraq 
and was suspicious of Tehran’s support of subversive elements directed at the overthrow 
of the Baathist regime.67  A successful invasion of Iran offered the potential of removing 
this threat to the Iraqi government. Saddam also coveted the oil-rich Iranian province of 
Khuzestan, and falsely hoped an invasion would result in a rebellion against Tehran by 
the province’s Arab minority.68  Finally, Saddam sought to reestablish Iraqi control over 
the Shatt al-Arab waterway and secure areas in the vicinity of Qasr e-Sharin that the 1975 
Algiers Accord had ceded to Iraq.69  The invasion was timed to take advantage of the 
poor condition of the Iranian military, which had been weakened by revolutionary purges.  
Saddam believed that a quick offensive aimed at limited territorial goals would pressure 
Tehran to seek a ceasefire.  Unfortunately, Saddam Hussein miscalculated.  Tehran 
viewed the conflict in far less limited terms and, as a result, would fight the war with a 
ferocity born of religious zeal aimed at the overthrow of the Iranian dictator. 
C. IRANIAN OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY 
Revolutionary regimes thrive on war, and Iran’s was no exception.  Viewing the 
conflict as the “Imposed War,” Tehran considered the conflict from a vastly different 
perspective than Saddam Hussein.  For Iran, the conflict was less a war over territory and 
control of the Shatt al Arab waterway than a standoff between “absolute good and 
absolute evil.”70  While, to an extent, territory did matter, in that the expulsion of Iraqi 
forces from Persian territory was an important objective, Tehran also sought to topple 
Iraq’s Baathist regime and further the spread of the Iranian Revolution.  The religious 
significance of the war for Iran explains Tehran’s view of the conflict as an “unlimited 
war.” 
                                                 
67 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, 31.    
68 Efraim Karsh, The Iran – Iraq War 1980 – 1988, 27.  
69 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, 31. 
70 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2006), 131. 
22 
Ayatollah Khomeini defined the war as a battle between good and evil: “You are 
fighting to protect Islam and he is fighting to destroy Islam.  There is absolutely no 
question of peace or compromise.”71  The Iranians viewed their participation in the 
conflict as a defense of Islam; thus, compromise with the Iraqi “usurpers” was out of the 
question.72  Framing the war in religious-based absolutes raised the stakes of the conflict 
for Iran, transforming it into an unlimited war requiring Iraqi “unconditional surrender,” 
making a negotiated settlement to the war an impossibility until 1988.  Tehran’s hard-line 
stance effectively painted Iran into a corner from which the war had to be fought until 
victory, i.e. the overthrow of the Iraqi Baathist regime and the extension of the Islamic 
revolution into Iraq, was achieved.  
D. WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF: 1981 – 1986   
By the autumn of 1981, the ground war had started to turn against Iraq.  Iranian 
offensives pushed the Iraqi army out of many of the areas conquered in the 1980 
invasion, prompting Saddam Hussein to announce on April 22, 1982, that he would 
withdraw his forces from Iranian territory if Tehran would agree to a ceasefire.73  
Saddam repeated this announcement in June 1982, following the successful Iranian 
recapture of Khuzestan.  All calls for a ceasefire where dismissed by Tehran.  By July, 
the Iranian army had commenced offensive operations aimed at Basra.  Iran would 
remain on the offensive throughout 1983, embarking on many operations, largely 
unsuccessful, aimed at seizing Iraqi territory. 
1. Sporadic Attacks: 1981 – 1983  
 The war in the Persian Gulf remained a rather small, one sided affair throughout 
the first 30 months of hostilities.  In 1981, Iraq conducted five attacks against shipping, 
resulting in three vessels being sunk and one declared a constructive total loss (CTL).74  
These initial Iraqi efforts were primarily directed against vessels in the port of Bandar-e 
Khomeini in northwest Iran.  In 1982, Iraq conducted 21 attacks resulting in five vessels 
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being sunk and five being declared CTLs.75  In April 1982, following Iran’s success in 
pressuring Syria to close off pipelines transferring Iraqi oil to Mediterranean ports for 
export, Iraq focused its anti-ship efforts against traffic calling on the main Iranian oil 
export terminal at Kharg Island.  This action was reinforced by the August 12, 1982, 
announcement of an exclusion zone surrounding Kharg Island.  Iraq’s objective was to 
intimidate foreign ship owners from transporting Iranian oil.76  On May 30, the Turkish-
flagged tanker Atlas I was struck by an Iraqi bomb, becoming the first tanker damaged in 
the war.77  Iran responded by deploying surface to air missile-equipped ships to the area 
and by providing armed escort for tanker shipping. 
Iraqi anti-shipping efforts cooled somewhat in 1983, conducting 13 attacks, all by 
helicopters.78  The Iraqi attacks sunk three vessels and resulted in six being declared 
CTLs.  The low numbers of Iraqi attacks, possibly the result of shortages in missiles or 
available aircraft, were reinforced by false claims of vessels damaged to dissuade 
shippers from transporting Iranian oil.  Iranian oil exports did not suffer greatly from the 
Iraqi attacks.  Iranian oil exports during the period actually expanded from .715 million 
barrels per day (MPD) in 1981 to 1.72 million MPD in 1983.79 
2. The Tanker War: 1984 
By the beginning of 1984, the ground war had devolved into a bloody stalemate 
that appeared endless.  In an attempt to break the stalemate Iraq drastically expanded its 
anti-shipping campaign in the Persian Gulf.  In 1984, Iraqi aircraft struck 58 merchant 
vessels resulting in six sinkings and 28 ships being declared CTLs, a fourfold increase in 
attacks from the previous year.80  In late April, Iraqi anti-ship capabilities were enhanced 
with the introduction of the Dassault Super Entendard attack aircraft, five of which were 
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on loan from France.81  Armed with the French-built Exocet missile, the Super Entendard 
improved Iraqi capability to strike targets at greater ranges.  Iraqi objectives in 
intensifying its anti-shipping campaign centered on severing Iran’s primary war-
supporting economic lifeline: the Gulf oil trade.  A secondary objective was to use the 
attacks to goad Iran into expanding the war by deciding to attack shipping trading with 
neutral Gulf states.  Such a scenario offered the possibility of western intervention against 
Iran.82  
Iran commenced its campaign against Persian Gulf shipping with an attack on the 
Kuwaiti Tanker Umm Casbah on May 13, 1984.  The severing of Iraqi access to the 
Persian Gulf at the start of the war coupled with the relative invulnerability of oil 
pipelines transporting Iraqi oil to ports in Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Jordan forced Iran to 
target vessels calling on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.  During 1984, Iran conducted 19 
attacks resulting in one vessel being sunk and two declared CTLs.83  Nearly all the 
attacks were directed against vessels trading with Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, Kuwaiti-
owned vessels being victimized four times.  Additionally, the Iranian navy stepped up its 
boardings of neutral vessels in the Strait of Hormuz in search of contraband cargos 
destined for Iraq.  By targeting Iraq’s allies, Iran hoped to impose a price on Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and the other GCC countries that would punish them for their support of 
Iraq and persuade them to pressure Saddam Hussein to curtail Iraqi attacks on Iranian 
shipping.84  
The Gulf Cooperation Council, alarmed by the implementation of the Iranian 
tanker war strategy, appealed to the United Nations Security Council.  UN Security 
Council Resolution 552, passed on June 1, 1984, condemned “the recent attacks on 
commercial shipping to and from Saudi Arabia” and demanded that “such attacks should 
                                                 
81 Jane’s Publishing Co. Ltd, Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft 1982 – 83 (London: Jane’s Publishing 
Co. Ltd, 1982), 53.  The Dassault Super Entendard had a maximum speed of Mach 1.3 and a combat radius 
of 270 nautical miles.  It could carry one AM-39 Exocet missile.  The Exocet missile had a range of 26 to 
37 nautical miles. 
82 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons, 170 – 171. 
83 Navias and Hooton, Tanker Wars, 83.  These attacks resulted in one vessel being sunk and two 
being declared CTLs.  Four of these attacks targeted Kuwaiti-flagged vessels, none of which were sunk or 
declared CTL.  One attack damaged a Saudi-flagged vessel.     
84 Ibid., 72.  
25 
cease forthwith.”85  The United States supported resolution 552 and condemned the 
Iranian escalation.  Simultaneously, the United States was becoming increasingly 
concerned with the war’s threat to Western oil supplies and to the stability of moderate 
Arab regimes.86 
 
Figure 1.   Persian Gulf Shipping Routes and Maritime Exclusion Zones (From: Karsh, 
The Iran – Iraq War 1980 – 1988) 87 
 
3. Neutrals Under Attack: 1985 – 1986 
The Tanker War was fought somewhat sporadically in 1985.  Iraq conducted 33 
attacks resulting in two sinkings and 11 vessels being declared CTLs.88  The Iranian air 
force conducted 17 attacks, two of which targeted Kuwaiti-flagged vessels, resulting in a 
Panamanian container ship being declared a CTL.89  As was the case in 1984, the 
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majority of Iranian attacks were directed against vessels trading with Kuwaiti ports.  
These attacks were supplemented by increased Iranian search and seizure activity in the 
Strait of Hormuz, primarily targeted against vessels trading with Kuwait or Saudi Arabia.  
Several cargos were confiscated by the Iranians and a 23,618 DWT Kuwaiti dry cargo 
vessel, the Ibn al Beitar, was actually seized by the Iranian navy.90   
The war in the Persian Gulf exploded in 1986, chiefly owing to events in the land 
war, in which Iran’s natural superiority, if only in the production of cannon fodder, was 
beginning to tell.  In late February Iranian army units concluded the successful capture of 
the Fao peninsula, and in mid-March commenced operations, ultimately unsuccessful, 
aimed at the capture of Basra.  Faced with a deteriorating situation on the ground, Iraq 
reinvigorated its efforts against Persian Gulf shipping, conducting 62 successful attacks 
resulting in four sinkings and 18 vessels being declared CTLs.91   Iran promptly 
responded in kind, conducting 41 successful attacks, a nearly threefold increase over the 
previous year.92  No vessels were sunk, but six were declared CTLs.  Two Kuwaiti and 
six Saudi vessels were struck by the Iranians in 1986.  Alarmingly for the GCC countries, 
nearly all the vessels targeted by Iran during 1986 were trading with Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Oman or the UAE.  
E. ASSESSMENT OF IRAQI ATTACKS 
Iraq depended almost entirely on aircraft to conduct its attacks against merchant 
shipping throughout the Tanker War.93  Initially, Iraq’s weapons of choice were 
helicopters firing Exocet missiles.  This combination was responsible for 82 percent of all 
attacks between 1981 and 1983.  The delivery of five French-built Super Entendard 
aircraft allowed Iraq to strike deeper into the Gulf.  The Super Entendards drew first 
blood on March 27, 1984, sinking the South Korean tug Heyang Ilho and damaging the 
Saudi-flagged tanker Safina al Arab.94  Exocet-firing Super Entendards conducted the 
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majority of Iraqi shipping attacks until they were supplanted by another French-built 
strike aircraft, the Mirage F-1EQ, in July, 1985.95  Between the introduction of the Super 
Entendard in March 1984, and the end of the war in July 1988, fixed wing aircraft were 
responsible for 89 percent of Iraqi anti-ship attacks. 
Iraq declared the area north of 29 degrees 30 minutes north latitude a “prohibited 
war zone” on October 1980.  Additionally, a maritime exclusion zone around the main 
Iranian oil export terminal at Kharg Island was declared in August 1982.  While Baghdad 
insisted that these exclusion zones were designed to “cope with the difficulties in 
distinguishing between the nationalities of vessels in the Persian Gulf,” in reality no 
effort was made to accurately determine the nationality of the vessels which were 
attacked.96  In reality, the Iraqi exclusion zones acquired the character of a free-fire zone, 
in which any and all vessels were potential targets, an environment that was well suited to 
the Exocet missile, with its long range and fire-and-forget capability.97  The dangers of 
Iraqi carelessness in identifying targets coupled with the long-range capability of the 
Mirage F-1EQ/Exocet missile system were made clear to the United States with the May 
17, 1987, attack on USS Stark (FFG-31).     
Iraqi efforts to undermine Iranian oil exports were only marginally effective.  The 
Iranian oil industry had been crippled by the Iranian Revolution, but by 1983, the year 
before the Iraqis commenced the Tanker War, Iranian crude oil exports had recovered to 
approximately 1.71 million barrels of crude oil a day (MPD).98  The level of exports 
dropped to 1.45 MPD by 1986, but in 1987, when Iraqi attacks reached their highest total 
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drop in crude oil prices between 1986 and 1987.99  The Iraqis simply lacked the 
capability to substantially reduce Iranian oil exports.  The best Saddam Hussein could 
hope for was mere harassment.100 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Total 
5 21 13 58 33 62 192 
Table 1.   Iraqi Attacks on Merchant Shipping, 1981 – 1986 (From:  Navias and 
Hooton,  Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During the Iran – 
Iraq Crisis 1980 – 1988)101 
 
The Iraqi Tanker War strategy succeeded, however, in bringing about Western 
intervention in the Iran – Iraq War.  Iranian attacks on neutral vessels, in particular 
vessels trading with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, unleashed a torrent of criticism from 
Western nations on Tehran.  By the end of 1986, Kuwaiti-owned vessels had been the 
victims of eight of Iran’s 77 successful attacks, prompting the Emirate to approach the 
United States on December 10, 1986, to seek the possibility of its ships obtaining 
protection from Iran under the guns of the United States Navy.  
F. ASSESSMENT OF IRANIAN ATTACKS 
Iran depended almost entirely on fixed wing aircraft to carry out its initial strikes 
on shipping in 1984 and 1985; Iranian jets were responsible for 31 of 36 attacks during 
this period.  Iranian helicopters spearheaded an energized Iranian anti-shipping campaign 
in 1986, conducting 28 of 41 attacks.  Hampered by a lack of spare parts, and vitally 
needed for operations ashore, Iranian air attacks on neutral shipping slowed and the 
Iranian navy shouldered more of the anti-ship load in September 1986.  Between 
September 1986 and March 1987, Iranian Vosper class frigates firing Sea Killer anti-ship 
missiles conducted 12 of 20 attacks, sinking a Singapore-flagged tug on March 28, 
1987.102 
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Iranian attacks on neutral shipping were supplemented by increased boardings of 
merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.  The Kuwaiti-flagged containerships Al 
Muharraq and Al Wattyah were seized by Iran in June and September 1985, 
respectively.103  In January 1986, West German and British vessels were boarded and 
searched by the Iranian navy.  On January 12, 1986, the American-flagged cargo vessel 
President Taylor was stopped and boarded while in the Gulf of Oman en route to Al 
Fujayrah, UAE with a load of cotton.  While the vessel was released by Iran, the United 
States expressed concern that these incidents carried the danger of “misunderstandings, 
overstepping of rights and norms, and even violence.”104  A similar event was averted in 
May, when the destroyer David R. Ray prevented an Iranian frigate from boarding the 
American merchant vessel President McKinley.105  The following September, the brief 
detention of two Soviet merchant vessels by Iran prompted Moscow to dispatch an 
additional warship to the Persian Gulf.  
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Total 
0 0 0 19 17 41 77 
Table 2.   Iranian Attacks on Merchant Shipping, 1981 – 1986 (From:  Navias and 
Hooton,  Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During the Iran – 
Iraq Crisis 1980 – 1988)106  
 
In April 1987, responsibility for Iranian anti-ship attacks shifted from the regular 
Iranian navy to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.  The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, also 
known as the Pasdaran, formally inaugurated its Navy in 1987, although it had been 
operating surreptitiously in the Gulf since 1982.107  Motivated by religious zeal and anti-
U.S. rhetoric, the Pasdaran utilized Boghammer speedboats armed with machine guns 
and rocket propelled grenades (RPG) to harass merchant shipping.  While insufficient to 
sink a large ship, these weapons were more than capable of killing and injuring merchant 
seamen.  The first attack credited to the Pasdaran occurred on October 22, 1986, against  
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the Kuwaiti tanker Al Faiha.  Between April 1987 and the Iranian acceptance of a 
ceasefire in July 1988, the Pasdaran were responsible for 82 percent of Iranian attacks on 
shipping.108 
Tehran’s war effort would have been better served by Iran remaining out of the 
Tanker War.  The Iranian strategy of inducing GCC pressure on Saddam Hussein to halt 
Iraqi attacks on Iranian shipping was a complete failure.  GCC countries either refrained 
from pressuring Iraq to halt its anti-shipping campaign or Saddam Hussein refused to 
listen.  By attacking neutral vessels, Tehran played directly into Iraqi hands: the Iranian 
attacks caused Kuwait to look towards the United States for protection while 
simultaneously giving birth to an increased Western naval presence in the Gulf, as Great 
Britain, West Germany and France dispatched warships to the Persian Gulf to protect 
their respective merchant shipping.   
G. THE U.S. AND THE TANKER WAR 
Carter Administration reaction to the September 23, 1980, commencement of the 
Iran – Iraq War focused on the conflict’s potential dangers to Persian Gulf oil shipments.   
Speaking to reporters on September 24, President Carter acknowledged the “threat to the 
economic health of all nations” posed by a suspension of tanker traffic through the 
Persian Gulf and emphasized that it was “imperative that there be no infringement of that 
freedom of passage of ships to and from” this vital region.109  Three weeks later 
Secretary of State Muskie asserted that the United States would “do what is necessary to 
protect free shipping in the Strait of Hormuz from any interference.”110 
The importance of the Middle East to the United States was not diminished by the 
inauguration of President Reagan in January 1981.  The focus of the new Administration 
remained fixed on the prevention of Soviet expansion into the Persian Gulf region.  To 
this end, the Reagan Administration pushed to sell Saudi Arabia F-15 fighters and E-3 
AWACS aircraft.  In October 1981, President Reagan expanded America’s commitment 
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to Saudi Arabia by announcing that the United States would not allow an Iranian-style 
revolution to topple the ruling regime.  With this announcement, known as the Reagan 
Corollary to the Carter Doctrine, the American protective umbrella over the Persian Gulf 
was broadened to include internal as well as external threats to the Persian Gulf region.  
American commitment to Persian Gulf security was further reinforced with the creation 
of Central Command in 1983. 
United States Navy presence in the Persian Gulf was not significantly impacted 
by the Iran – Iraq War.  The small size of the MEF (four ships) was merely augmented by 
the presence of an aircraft carrier battlegroup in the Indian Ocean.   As late as 1986, 
events in the Mediterranean and in Central America reduced aircraft carrier presence in 
the Indian Ocean to approximately six months out of the year.111  The small size of the 
United States naval presence in the Gulf coupled with the relatively low number of ship 
attacks helped ensure the safety of the Middle East Force throughout the first three years 
of the war. 
The 1984 commencement of Iran’s anti-shipping campaign brought about the first 
direct U.S. military involvement in the Iran – Iraq war.  In response to Iranian attacks on 
shipping in its territorial waters, Saudi Arabia announced the creation of an Air Defense 
Identification Zone (ADIZ) which extended far out into the Persian Gulf and came to be 
known as the “Fahd Line.”  United States Air Force E-3 AWACS aircraft and KC-135 
tankers supported Saudi F-15 fighters patrolling this line.  On June 5, 1984, an Iranian F-
4 Phantom fighter was destroyed by a Saudi F-15 under the direction of the American 
AWACS.   
While the beginning of the Tanker War did not dramatically alter the size of the 
small U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf, American defensive measures were altered in 
January 1984, through the issuance of a Notice to Airmen and Mariners (NOTAM).  The 
January 1984 NOTAM advised that U.S. naval forces “operating in the Persian Gulf, 
Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman are taking increased defensive precautions 
against terrorist threats.”112  Aircraft operating at altitudes of 2000 feet or less were 
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instructed to approach U.S. naval vessels no closer than five miles.  Aircraft passing 
within five miles of an American warship at an altitude of less than 2000 feet were 
required to establish radio contact or “be held at risk to U.S. defensive measures.”113  A 
second NOTAM issued in 1986 warned that surface and subsurface vessels passing closer 
than five nautical miles of American warships that failed to radio their intentions would 
likewise be subject to U.S. defensive measures.114  The January 1986 boarding of 
President Taylor by Iran prompted the MEF to be augmented by an additional frigate, 
USS Jack Williams (FFG-24).115  Thus, even as the Iran-Iraq war entering a new and 
more intense phase in 1986, American naval presence and posture in the Gulf was 
becoming correspondingly more guarded, in response to local concerns about the security 
of U.S. vessels operating there. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
By the end of 1986, Iran and Iraq had combined to strike 269 vessels resulting in 
21 vessels being sunk and 78 being declared CTLs.116  This number, while substantial, 
represented less than one percent of all shipping transiting the Persian Gulf.117  Western 
access to Persian Gulf oil had not been seriously threatened and the price of a barrel of 
crude oil remained remarkably constant during this period.118  The primary effect of the 
Tanker War was that it would serve as a catalyst for Western, primarily American, 
intervention in the Iran – Iraq War.  In December 1986 the Kuwaiti government 
approached the United States seeking protection for its tanker fleet from Iranian attacks.  
In 1987 the United States agreed to the Kuwaiti request as a means of realizing a myriad 
                                                 
113 De Guttry and Ronzitti, Law of Naval Warfare, 137. 
114 Ibid., 139. 
115 Crist, “Operation Earnest Will,” 63. 
116 Iraqi attacks resulted in 20 vessels being sunk and 69 being declared CTLs.  Iranian attacks 
resulted in one vessel being sunk and nine being declared CTLs.  No Kuwaiti-flagged vessels were sunk 
during this period.  
117 U.S. Congress.  Senate.  Committee on Armed Services.  U.S. Military To Protect “Re-Flagged” 
Kuwaiti Oil Tankers.  (Washington: U.S. Government printing Office, 1987), 87. 
118 U.S. Department of Energy, “Crude Oil Prices By Selected Type, 1970 – 2006,” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptb1107.html (accessed April 12, 2007).  Prices for Saudi Light Crude 
actually dropped from $34 USD to $28 USD between 1983 and 1986, the period during which the tanker 
heated up. 
33 
of strategic, political and economic objectives.  Meeting these objectives required the 
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IV. OPERATION EARNEST WILL: AMERICAN OBJECTIVES 
AND STRATEGY 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The increased susceptibility of Kuwaiti shipping to Iranian attack was a cause of 
great concern for Kuwait in the summer of 1986.119  The subject of Soviet or American 
naval protection for Kuwaiti shipping was broached at a November meeting of the GCC, 
which urged the Emirate to appeal to the United States.120  On December 10, 1986, the 
Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC) approached the United States Coast Guard to 
ascertain the requirements to register several of its vessels under the American flag.  The 
request was not in itself unusual, the Coast Guard having received approximately 50 such 
requests in the several years prior to the Kuwaiti inquiry.121    
The United States Embassy was officially informed of the Kuwaiti request on 
December 23.  On December 25, the same day the Coast Guard responded to the initial 
KOTC inquiry, the State Department sent a rather lukewarm reply to the Kuwaiti request.  
On January 13 the KOTC presented a formal inquiry to the U.S. Embassy, inquiring if 
Kuwaiti-owned vessels registered under the U.S. flag would be eligible for United States 
Navy protection.  The United States government learned at this time that the Kuwaitis 
were making identical inquiries to the Soviet Union.122  On January 29, Kuwait was 
informed that reflagging was permissible if all legal requirements were met.123  The 
Kuwaitis were informed on February 6 that reflagged vessels would be eligible for U.S. 
Navy protection.   
In late February, the Reagan Administration was informed that Kuwait intended 
to register six vessels under the American flag and five under the Soviet flag.  The 
Kuwaiti government had approached the Soviets in an effort to avoid becoming overly 
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dependent on one superpower.124  Kuwait’s simultaneous approach to both superpowers 
was in keeping with the Emirate’s long standing policy of “keeping both countries at 
arm’s length, but yet not too far as to alienate a potential ally.”125  Kuwaiti predisposition 
to play the superpowers off each other resembled the Emirate’s policies vis-à-vis Iran and 
Iraq.  Kuwait provided monetary grants to Saddam Hussein, opened its ports to Iraqi 
weapons shipments, and assisted in exporting Iraqi oil while simultaneously maintaining 
relations with Iran.  From the Kuwaiti perspective, the ideal outcome of the war would 
witness a return to the prewar status quo ante in which neither Iran nor Iraq was in a 
position to dominate the entire Persian Gulf.126   
The possibility of increased Soviet presence in the Gulf prompted Secretary of 
Defense Weinberger on March 7 to offer protection “to Kuwait’s vessels whether or not 
Kuwait sought to register them under the U.S. flag.”127  The American offer was 
incumbent on Kuwait halting its efforts to reflag several of its vessels under the hammer 
and sickle.  Kuwait accepted the American offer on March 9.  However, Kuwait 
remained determined to continue its relationship with the Soviet Union, agreeing to 
charter three Russian tankers to transport Kuwaiti oil.128   
B. THE USS STARK INCIDENT 
The United States Navy had had little direct involvement in the war in the Persian 
Gulf during the first six years of the Iran – Iraq War, and lacked a clear mission 
explaining its presence in the middle of a war zone.  Often standing helplessly by as 
neutral vessels were attacked by Iranian forces, the American presence in the Persian 
Gulf was nevertheless described by Secretary of Defense Weinberger as representing 
“immediately and directly, America’s commitment to stability in the region and our deep 
concern over the threat to that stability posed by the senseless Iran – Iraq War…Our ships 
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are not there as referees or dispassionate observers.”129  The danger of this ambiguous 
naval presence was made clear on May 17, 1987, by the Iraqi attack on USS Stark. 
USS Stark (FFG-31), under the command of Captain Glenn Brindel, departed 
from her homeport in Mayport, Florida on February 5, 1987.  Stark’s departure marked 
the culmination of months of training in preparation for deployment.  Coincident with 
training evolutions and combat drills, the crew of Stark received briefings in December 
1986 by CENTCOM staff members describing the Persian Gulf operating environment.  
The threat of mistaken attacks by Iraqi pilots firing Exocet missiles at maximum range 
was discussed as the most serious threat Captain Brindel and his crew would encounter in 
the Gulf.130  Brindel was instructed to remain vigilant whenever Iraqi jets were detected 
over the Persian Gulf and that he should not hesitate to lock onto Iraqi aircraft with 
Stark’s fire control radar, “as that appeared to be the only way to get the (Iraqi) pilot’s 
attention.”131  
The crew of USS Stark received a second briefing from officers of the Middle 
East Force staff on February, 28, 1987, while at anchor in Djibouti.  The briefing 
discussed the Rules of Engagement under which Stark would operate and provided a 
general overview of the Tanker War.132  Like the CENTCOM briefer three months 
before, the Middle East Force intelligence officer “highlighted that the probability of 
deliberate attack on U.S. forces was low, but that an indiscriminate attack in the Persian 
Gulf was a significant danger.”133  Additionally, Captain Brindel met informally with the 
Middle East Force Commander, Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, on at least three 
occasions to discuss the rules of engagement and Stark’s readiness.  Bernsen again 
emphasized the threat of inadvertent attack.134  The two officers met for a final time on 
May 15 and 16.  Bernsen emphasized that the Iraqis had commenced attacks on shipping 
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south of the “prohibited war zone” established in October, 1981.  Bernsen instructed 
Brindel to inform his crew of this change in Iraqi attack profiles, as an attack on May 14 
had occurred in close proximity to where Stark would soon be operating.135 
Prior experience demonstrated that the United States had reason to be concerned 
with the possibility of inadvertent Iraqi attacks on American warships.  In January 1985 
USS John Hancock (DD-981) may have been the target of an Iraqi Exocet missile.  The 
Exocet struck the Singapore-flagged tug Ribut, which was situated between the Iraqi 
aircraft and the American destroyer.136  Disaster nearly struck a second time on May 14, 
1987, three days prior to the Stark incident.  Another American destroyer, USS Coontz 
(DDG-40), was required to warn off an Iraqi F-1 strike aircraft via radio.  The Iraqi jet 
went on to attack a Panamanian or Liberian flag tanker.137    
On the evening of May 17, 1987, USS Stark was conducting a routine patrol 
outside of the Iranian exclusion zone in an area of the Persian Gulf designated Radar 
Picket Station (RPS) South.  This position placed Stark close to the center of the Persian 
Gulf, approximately 50 miles north northeast of Qatar.  At 1955, an American AWACS 
aircraft, call sign “Rainbow,” detected an Iraqi F-1 strike aircraft heading south from an 
air base near Basra.138  Rainbow alerted all naval vessels of the Iraqi aircraft’s presence 
via data link.   
Stark was operating under the ROE established in January 1984, which warned 
that unidentified aircraft approaching U.S. warships within five nautical miles at altitudes 
of less than 2000 feet would be “held at risk by U.S. defensive measures.”139  
Instructions issued by the Commander, Middle East Force (CMEF) in October 1985 
authorized U.S. warships to defend themselves if an aircraft demonstrated hostile action 
or intent.140  Prior to taking unidentified aircraft under fire, commanding officers were 
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instructed to make every effort to identify their vessels as an American warship, 
including radio calls, fire control radar lock-on, and warning shots.141  
Captain Brindel was informed of the Iraqi aircraft at 2015.  Brindel was 
preoccupied with preparations for Stark’s upcoming engineering evaluation and merely 
instructed his Tactical Action Officer (TAO) to watch the track closely in light of the 
recent Iraqi attacks in the southern Gulf.142  At approximately 2058, Stark gained radar 
contact on the Iraqi F-1.143    At about the same time, Rainbow observed the F-1 make a 
course change towards the American frigate, establishing a closest point of approach of 
11 miles.144  At 2105, at a range of 32.5 miles, the Iraqi aircraft turned directly towards 
the American frigate.  Two minutes later the Iraqi F-1 launched an Exocet missile at USS 
Stark from a range of 22.5 nautical miles.145  A second Exocet was fired one minute later.  
The crew of USS Stark remained unaware that two missiles had been fired at them and 
was fixated on obtaining data for CMEF-mandated contact reports.  No weapons or 
countermeasures systems were made ready to defend against attack. 
Crewmen standing duty inside Stark’s Combat Information Center (CIC) did not 
adequately appreciate the threat posed by the Iraqi F-1, and may not have fully 
understood the capabilities of the vessels weapons and sensor systems.  Radio warnings 
to the Iraqi aircraft were not issued until the aircraft was approximately 15.5 nautical 
miles away, about the same time the second Exocet was fired, and no effort was made to 
lock on to the F-1 until it was too late.146  Additionally, no surface-to-air missile was 
made ready, nor was Stark’s close-in weapons system (CIWS), designed as a last-ditch 
defense against anti-ship missiles such as Exocet, made ready to defend the ship.  Stark’s 
Tactical Action Officer (TAO) later testified that he decided against activating the CIWS 
due to fears of shooting the Iraqi aircraft down.  This was an impossibility, as the Iraqi jet 
never approached within ten miles of Stark, well outside the CIWS maximum range of 
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1500 yards.147  Stark’s CIC simply failed to see the Iraqi F-1 as a threat, the ship’s 
Executive Officer later testifying “Until we were hit, I did not perceive any danger.”148  
 
Figure 2.   USS Stark Incident (From: United States Department of State, U.S. Policy in 
the Persian Gulf)149 
 
The first Exocet struck Stark on the port forward side of the superstructure.  
Although the missile failed to detonate, fires ignited by the missile’s remaining rocket 
propellant, which burns at 3000 to 3500 degrees, resulted in horrible damage.150  Thirty 
seconds later, the second Exocet impacted Stark eight feet from where the first missile hit 
and exploded approximately three to five feet into the hull.151  The attack resulted in the 
deaths of thirty seven sailors, the largest single loss of life in the Tanker War. 
The official investigation into the Stark incident blamed the disaster on four 
factors: “failure of the Commanding Officer and Stark’s watch team to recognize the F-1 
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threat and effectively utilize the ship’s combat systems to respond to that threat; improper 
watch manning and watch standing; failure of the Commanding Officer and watch team 
to institute a proper state of weapons readiness; and an improper understanding by the 
Commanding Officer and watch team of the use of fire control radar as a measure short 
of deadly force in warning the threat and securing the safety of Stark.”152  Captain 
Brindel, his Executive Officer, and the TAO on duty at the time of the attack were 
relieved of their duties on board Stark as a result of these failures. 
While the official investigation into the Stark incident deemed the existing rules 
of engagement (ROE) to have been sufficient “to enable Stark to properly warn the Iraqi 
aircraft” and “to defend herself against hostile intent without absorbing the first hit,”153 
political pressure in Washington forced a change in American ROE.  General George 
Crist, CENTCOM Commander, explained this fact to Vice Admiral Bernsen, writing 
“We can’t afford to take a second hit….We shoot first.”154  One day later the ROE were 
adjusted to allow captains to warn aircraft at a distance of 50 miles and engage them at 25 
miles.  The Rules of Engagement were further modified in June 1987, and stressed the 
duty of naval officers to defend their vessels against hostile acts.155  Entry into Iranian 
and Iraqi territorial waters and exclusion zones was prohibited.  American forces could, 
however, enter territorial waters if attacked by forces from these restricted areas and were 
allowed to pursue the hostile force if it “continued to pose a threat to the safety of the 
American plane or ship.”156  Additionally, the United States developed deconfliction 
procedures with the Iraqis in order to preclude further attacks on American warships.   
Importantly, the Stark incident imparted a “don’t take the first round” mindset 
into the minds of American naval officers.157  This mindset was reinforced by the loss of 
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37 American sailors, as well as the fact that the attack ended the careers of Captain 
Brindel and two of his officers. Additionally, the ROE changes prompted by the Stark 
incident would provide USS Vincennes (CG 49) with the justification required to pursue 
Iranian small craft which would fire on the American cruiser’s embarked LAMPS 
helicopter a year later.  This combat action led to Vincennes shooting down Iran Air flight 
655, killing 290 civilians.   
C. U.S. OBJECTIVES 
The attack on USS Stark was an embarrassment for the U.S. Navy.  A 300 million 
dollar warship had been gravely damaged without so much as firing a shot in self 
defense.  The Iraqi attack energized Congressional interest in the Reagan 
Administration’s provocative new policy, which had been somewhat muted as a result of 
the ongoing Iran – Contra hearings.158  The Reagan Administration had initially informed 
Congress of the reflaging decision on March 12, 1987.159  On May 18, Newsweek 
magazine publicly revealed the Reagan Administration’s new Kuwait policy.160  The 
announcement of the decision to reflag the Kuwaiti tankers, coming so closely on the 
heels of the Stark incident, prompted multiple Congressional Hearings, during which the 
Reagan Administration was forced to defend its view of American interests in the Persian 
Gulf. 
1. Strategic Objectives 
The Reagan Administration asserted that a refusal of the Kuwaiti request would 
allow the Soviet Union an opportunity to expand its presence in the Persian Gulf.  The 
Administration acknowledged the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf region to the 
West and noted that the Soviets were “eager to exploit the opportunity created by the Iran 
– Iraq War and the perception of faltering U.S. interests to insert themselves into the 
Gulf.”161  Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger opined that a denial of the Kuwaiti 
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request would raise “doubts about our commitment to the stability of the regional states 
and about our objectives in the region,”162 resulting in the reliability of the United States 
falling under question.  This could potentially open the door for the Soviet Union to fill 
the resulting security vacuum throughout the Persian Gulf.  Concern over the prevention 
of growing Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf permeated Congressional hearings 
studying the reflagging policy in the wake of the Stark incident; when asked by Senator 
Sam Nunn (D-GA) if the United States would be amenable to reflagging Kuwaiti tankers 
in the absence of a potential Soviet role, Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs 
Michael Armacost responded that “it would have been a very much tougher call in the 
absence of the Soviet angle.”163 
 Preventing the expansion of Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf was a second 
strategic goal of the United States.  While acknowledging that the United States did not 
view victory by either belligerent as within its interests, the United States had tilted 
appreciably towards Iraq by supporting Saddam Hussein’s allies while simultaneously 
discouraging weapons sales to Iran.164  The Reagan Administration was concerned with 
Iranian efforts to eliminate superpower presence in the Gulf and alarmed by the potential 
spread of the Iranian Revolution to moderate GCC countries.  Reflagging was viewed as 
a “firm but unprovocative policy” which would “encourage an Iranian reevaluation of its 
foreign policy” leading to Tehran seeking a “modus vivendi with its Gulf neighbors and 
the United States.”165 
2. Political Objectives 
American political interests centered on supporting moderate Gulf state’s security 
efforts against direct and indirect Iranian pressure.166  Along with arms transfers, many of 
which were seriously opposed by Congress, reflagging offered an opportunity to restore 
American credibility among moderate Arab governments in the wake of several recent 
policy set backs while simultaneously denying the Soviet Union and Iran increased 
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leverage in the Gulf.167  The Iran Hostage Crisis, the Desert One disaster, the bombing of 
the Marine Barracks in Beirut and subsequent withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon, 
the failure of Congress to approve weapons exports to Arab countries and, most recently, 
the Iran – Contra scandal had undermined the American position in the Persian Gulf.  
Staunch support of Kuwait would demonstrate to potential allies and enemies that the 
United States could be trusted as a dependable ally.  Admiral William J. Crowe, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, viewed reflagging as “the best chance we had to 
repair our Arab policy and to make some significant headway in an area where it was 
absolutley crucial for us to forge the strongest ties we could manage.”168 
3. Economic Objectives 
Economic considerations also figured into the Reagan Administration’s strategic 
calculus.  The importance of the Middle East market to American industry coupled with 
the West’s growing appetite for, and vulnerability to a disruption in the flow of, Persian 
Gulf oil mandated that the United States have “unimpeded access to and from the Gulf, 
now and in the future.”169  The Administration was forced to concede, however, that 
these economic concerns were not completely supported by the actual conditions in the 
Gulf in the Spring of 1987.  The number of attacks conducted by both belligerents, while 
substantial, actually represented less than one percent of the total surface traffic transiting 
the Persian Gulf yearly.  However, Kuwaiti shipping represented six percent of all 
attacks.170  Additionally, despite Iranian rhetoric threatening to close the Strait of 
Hormuz, bluster reinforced by the alarming deployment of Chinese-supplied Silkworm 
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been seriously threatened and oil prices remained low.171  Additionally, a glut of excess 
tanker tonnage ensured that there was no shortage of ships to transport Middle Eastern 
oil.172 
 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Saudi Crude Price 32.00 34.00 34.00 29.00 29.00 28.00 16.15 17.52 
Shipping Attacks 5 21 13 77 50 103 186 90 
Table 3.   Price Per Barrel of Saudi Crude Oil (USD) Compared to Numbers of 
Shipping Attacks Conducted by Both Belligerents, 1981 – 1988 (After: U.S. 
Department of Energy, Crude oil Prices By selected Type, 1970 – 2005)173  
 
D. AMERICAN STRATEGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 
While Congress debated the pros and cons of reflagging, the American military 
commenced planning for the operation, now known as Operation Earnest Will.  Inbound 
convoys, escorted by two to three American warships, would commence at Khawr 
Fakkan, Oman, and proceed along a predetermined course, termed a Q-route, through the 
Strait of Hormuz and along the western Persian Gulf to Kuwait.174  Additional American 
naval vessels were stationed at both ends of the Strait of Hormuz and at a position just 
south of the Iraqi exclusion zone.175  These vessels would be supported by a Saudi E-3 
AWACS aircraft.   
In the event Iran responded agressively to the U.S. policy, American planners 
prioritized the methods with which Tehran would challenge the United States.176  
American planners considered the threat posed by the Chinese-supplied Silkworm missile 
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sites guarding the Strait of Hormuz to be the most serious.177  The Americans assumed 
that these missiles were tightly controlled by Tehran and thus, if fired at an American 
warship, would constitute “a deliberate hostile act against the United States.”178  In light 
of the Silkworm threat, American strategy placed a heavy emphasis on deterrence.179  To 
this end an aircraft carrier battlegroup was stationed in the Gulf of Oman in a position to 
strike at Iranian targets should Tehran be so bold as to attack an American vessel.  
Faith that the presence of an aircraft carrier battlegroup would deter Iran from 
openly confronting the United States Navy in the Persian Gulf was based on historical 
experience dating from the Iran Hostage Crisis.  Throughout this period the United States 
had maintained one or more aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean in a position to strike 
Iran.  The fact that Tehran did not attempt to attack American Naval vessels during the 
crisis instilled confidence in American decisionmakers that Iran was well aware of the 
destructive potential of an American aircraft carrier and would have no desire to initiate a 
war with the United States.180  Tehran’s more likely course of action would be to 
undertake military operations that could not be directly traced to Iran, such as use of 
mines or regional terrorism.  Additionally, experience in the Persian Gulf throughout the 
Tanker War had demonstrated to American Naval Officers a reluctance on the part of the 
Iranians to conduct attacks within sight of U.S. warships. 
Despite concerns over potential hostile Iranian response to reflagging, few within 
DOD and the Reagan Administration believed that the Iranians would risk a military 
confrontation with the United States.  Admiral William J. Crowe posited that the Iranians 
“would not be eager to get into a real naval scrap” and that the Iranians were likely to 
realize the threat posed by an American carrier battlegroup.181  This opinion was echoed 
among officers in CENTCOM and the Navy’s Middle East Force (MEF).182 
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E. GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY 
Achieving the strategic, political and economic objectives set forth by the Reagan 
Administration in the spring of 1987 required that the Americans embark on a policy of 
gunboat diplomacy.  James Cable defines gunboat diplomacy as “the use or threat of 
limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or avert 
loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals 
within the territory or jurisdiction of their own state.”183  Naval force is considered 
limited when four criteria have been met.  First, “the act or threat of force should possess 
a definite purpose, of which the extent is apparent to both sides.”184  In the case of 
Operation Earnest Will, the purpose of naval force was to deter Iranian attacks on 
Kuwaiti-owned vessels.  Second, the level of force used by the assailant must be 
considered tolerable by the victim of the policy.185  If the victim finds the assailant’s use 
of force to be intolerable, there is danger that the victim will respond with unlimited 
force.186  Third, the level of force employed should have a reasonable expectation to 
achieve its purpose.187  Finally, the “force employed should be the minimum needed to 
achieve the desired result.”188 
Cable’s analysis subdivides gunboat diplomacy into four specific categories.  
Definitive Force is the threat or use of limited naval force to create or remove a fait 
accompli.189  With regard to the Soviet Union, Operation Earnest Will was an American 
policy of definitive force gunboat diplomacy: by agreeing to reflag and protect 11 
Kuwaiti-owned tankers, the United States irreversibly excluded the Soviet Navy from 
assuming a greater role in the Persian Gulf.  The purpose of Catalytic Force is to realize 
advantages, “their nature and their achievement still undetermined,” through the limited 
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use of naval forces.190  The July 1958 landing of the U.S. Marines in Lebanon is an 
example of Catalytic Force: the Marines “had not landed with a defined objective; their 
job was to hold the situation and to gain time for the U.S. government to decide what the 
objective should be.”191  Expressive Force utilizes naval forces to send signals, provide 
support to unconvincing statements, or act as an outlet for emotion.192  The dispatch of a 
second American aircraft carrier battlegroup to the Persian Gulf in the winter of 2007 
provides an example of expressive force: the second battlegroup could not affect Iranian 
nuclear ambitions or institute regime change.  It merely acted as window dressing 
supporting the Bush Administration’s anti-Iranian sentiment.  When directed at Iran, 
Operation Earnest Will was a policy of Purposeful Force gunboat diplomacy. 
1. Purposeful Force Gunboat Diplomacy 
The goal of purposeful force is to change the policy of the victim government.193  
The purposeful employment of limited naval force has no narrow military objective; 
force acts as a catalyst to induce a government to “take a decision that would not 
otherwise have been taken – to do something or to stop doing it, or to refrain from a 
contemplated course of action.”194  In the case of Operation Earnest Will, the United 
States utilized purposeful force to convince Tehran to halt attacks on neutral, specifically 
Kuwaiti, shipping transiting the Persian Gulf. 
Utilization of purposeful force to coerce a government into altering a policy is 
risky for the assailant in that success requires the voluntary acquiesence of the victim.195  
Thus, to a large extent, the ultimate success or failure of Operation Earnest Will could 
only be determined by Tehran; i.e. the power to halt attacks on neutral shipping rested 
entirely with the Iranian government.  For purposeful force to be effective, it is vital 
during the planning process for the assailant to consider factors which influence the 
victim’s decision.  These factors include the political outlook of the victim, the 
effectiveness of the victim’s administrative authority, the nature of the victim’s political 
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support, and an understanding of the experiences which have conditioned the victim 
government’s expectations.196  These factors were not adequately considered by 
American planners, resulting in erroneous assumptions regarding Iran’s response to 
Operation Earnest Will which endangered American objectives in the Persian Gulf.     
F. FACTORS INFLUENCING IRANIAN ACQUIESCENCE 
 The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was carried out by a disorganized coalition of 
competing factions, united chiefly by their opposition to the Pahlavi regime, but lacking 
broader ideological cohesion.  Following months of sometimes deadly infighting, 
religious fundamentalists emerged triumphant over secular democrats and leftist 
revolutionaries.  The formative period of the revolution, of which the Iran – Iraq War was 
a major part, witnessed intense competition between three factions within the religious 
fundamentalist camp.197   
The Iran – Iraq war strengthened the hold of the religious fundamentalists on the 
Iranian people.198  Framing the war as a religious mission, the conflict empowered 
radical elements of the regime which had been instrumental in the formulation of Iran’s 
confrontational foreign policy of the 1980s and had proved masterful in mobilizing 
popular support for the Iran – Iraq war.199  Utilizing Shi’a symbology to mobilize the 
population and impart the religious zeal necessary to ensure popular support throughout 
eight years of violent, bloody conflict, the radical faction transformed participation in the 
war into a religious duty, in which soldiers killed in action were labeled as martyrs.200  
The revolutionary fervor required to sustain such high levels of religiously-based 
motivation within the population further pushed the regime towards a radical, leftist, and 
increasingly confrontational stance.201  Additionally, the West’s failure to condemn the 
Iraqi invasion strengthened the perception that Iran and Islam were under siege from the 
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West.202  The 1987 American decision to provide protection for Kuwaiti-owned shipping 
resulted in several direct military confrontations with the Iranians in the Persian Gulf and 
strengthened the more radical segments of the ruling regime.203   
A better understanding of the importance of the Iran – Iraq war to the religious 
fundamentalists in general and radical elements in particular could have lead to different 
conclusions vis-à-vis the question of whether Iran would be deterred from attacking 
American shipping.  Confrontation with the United States in the Persian Gulf coupled 
with militant rhetoric and brinkmanship could be utilized by Tehran to achieve domestic 
political goals.204  Confrontation strengthened the position of radical fundamentalists 
within the Iranian government while simultaneously providing Tehran with an issue to 
reenergize dwindling public support of the war effort.205  Together, these factors helped 
sustain the Iranian Revolution.  
Equally important, Iran viewed the war with Iraq not in territorial terms, but as a 
test for Islam.206  In essence, Iran viewed the conflict as a defensive war to protect Islam 
and spread the revolution.207  Framing Iran’s war effort as a defense of Islam raised the 
stakes of the conflict immeasurably, pushing pragmatic military considerations aside in 
favor of affirming and defending Islamic values.208  These factors worked against 
moderate voices in Tehran urging caution in lieu of provoking clashes with American 
forces in the Gulf. 
American planners failed to account for Iranian perceptions of the United States 
in forming the assumption that Tehran would quietly accept the new American policy.  
Distrust of the United States dated from the 1953 coup which overthrew Mohammed 
Mosaddeq, deepened as American aid dollars assisted in financing the increasingly 
autocratic Shah’s policies and played a major role in the seizure of the American embassy 
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in Tehran in 1979.209  Critically, the United States was viewed as supporting Iraqi war 
efforts.  The United States had not protested Iraqi attacks on Iranian shipping, Saddam 
Hussein’s use of WMD, or the use of SCUD missiles against Iranian population 
centers.210  Despite the Reagan Administration’s declarations of neutrality, Iran viewed 
support for Kuwait as tacit support for Iraq.  Thus, from an Iranian point of view, prior 
experiences with the United States did not support the recognition of America as a neutral 
party in the conflict, but added to Tehran’s perception that the United States was hostile 
to Iran. 
The failure to adequately consider the myriad of factors influencing Iran’s 
reaction to the reflagging policy seriously jeopardized the Reagan Administration’s 
Persian Gulf goals.  Tehran’s political outlook, its view of the Iran – Iraq war as a test for 
Islam and its perceptions of the United States worked against Iran quietly bowing to the 
American display of limited naval force.  A more in-depth analysis of these critical 
elements could have lead to less optimistic assumptions with respect to Iran’s acceptance 
of Operation Earnest Will.  Less complacent assumptions would have facilitated more 
informed risk assessment with regard to the danger of Iranian escalation and would have 
allowed the Americans to more critically examine the danger of being dragged deeper 
into the Iran – Iraq conflict prior to undertaking Operation Earnest Will. 
American failure to adequately examine the circumstances determining Tehran’s 
acceptance of the reflagging policy resulted in the failure of the United States to correctly 
judge the manner in which Iran would respond to purposeful naval force.  Having made 
the assumption that Iran would not risk open confrontation with the United States by 
attacking a U.S. warship or convoy, it is curious that American planners focused so 
intently on the Silkworm threat at the expense of the dangers posed by mines and 
irregular forces.  American planners believed that Tehran would be more likely to employ 
these weapons in the event Iran chose to confront the United States Navy in the Persian 
Gulf.211  The failure of the United States to properly assess the risks to American vessels 
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and to implement adequate safeguards, particularly the failure to deploy minesweepers to 
the Persian Gulf prior to the commencement of convoy operations, unnecessarily 
jeopardized American lives and shipping and could have carried disastrous results for 
American standing in the Middle East had a naval vessel been sunk.  Indeed, Tehran 
hoped that American casualties resulting from Iranian mines and Pasdaran attacks would 
result in Congressional pressure to reduce the American commitment in the Persian 
Gulf.212  Senator John Warner (R–VA) warned Admiral Crowe, “If you lose one man 
over there you’ll have to come out of the Gulf.  One man!”213   Abandonment of the 
reflagging policy in the face of Congressional pressure over casualties would have 
reinforced Middle Eastern perceptions of the United States as an undependable ally, 
causing the moderate Gulf states that the Reagan Administration was so keen to court to 
turn towards the Soviet Union for protection 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
The eleven Kuwaiti-owned tankers were transferred to the Chesapeake Shipping 
Company Incorporated, a new entity owned entirely by the Kuwait Petroleum Company.  
To comply with American law, the CEO and Chairman of the Board of the Chesapeake 
Shipping Company were Americans, and only one of the four members of the board 
necessary to form a quorum was an alien.214  The ships themselves met all American 
legal requirements necessary to fly the American flag, although some waivers were 
issued with regard to drydocking and specific safety standards.  By law, the Master of 
each vessel was an American citizen.  All legal issues were resolved by July, 1987, and 
the American flag was raised up the masts of the eleven tankers. 
The first convoy was ready to commence its voyage to Kuwait in late July 1987. 
Prior to commencing convoy operations, the United States moved on the diplomatic front 
in an effort to end the seven year old conflict, pressing the United Nations Security 
Council to pass Resolution 598 on July 20, 1987.  The resolution demanded a cease fire 
and called for Iran and Iraq to work with the U.N. in constructing a peaceful settlement.  
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The resolution was accepted by Iraq.  Iran rejected the resolution on the grounds that Iraq 
was not labeled as the agressor.215  In late July, the first convoy was ready to commence 
its voyage to Kuwait.  The stage was set to determine if American planners had been 
correct in their assumption that Iran would not risk attacking vessels flying the American 
flag. 
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V. OPERATION EARNEST WILL: JULY, 1987 – APRIL, 1988 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
While the United States and Kuwait discussed the issue of reflagging, the war in 
the Persian Gulf continued unabated.  Iraqi aircraft attacked 24 ships through the first five 
months of 1987, resulting in three vessels being declared CTLs.216  Iraqi attacks came to 
a virtual halt in the aftermath of the May 17 attack on USS Stark, but were resumed on 
June 20. The ferocity of the Iraqi anti-ship campaign peaked in 1987, when Iraqi pilots 
conducted 97 attacks resulting in two vessels being sunk and seven being declared 
CTLs.217 
Iran responded by increasing the tempo of its anti-shipping campaign, conducting 
89 attacks in 1987, resulting in four vessels being sunk and two declared CTLs.218  The 
Iranian Navy conducted the majority of attacks through the first three months of 1987, 
culminating in the sinking of the Singapore-flagged tug Sedra by a Vosper Mk 5 class 
frigate on March 28.  Beginning in April primary responsibility for attacks on shipping 
fell onto the shoulders of the Pasdaran, which was responsible for 76% of the Iranian 
attacks conducted during the last eight months of 1987.219  
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total
Iraq 7 6 3 4 5 2 4 6 13 15 13 19 97 
Iran 7 3 3 3 8 5 4 4 14 11 10 17 89 
Table 4.   Frequency of Shipping Attacks, 1987 (From:  Navias and Hooton,  Tanker 
Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During the Iran – Iraq Crisis 1980 
– 1988)220 
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convoys.221  One of the victims, the Marshal Chuykov, was a Russian-flagged vessel 
chartered to Kuwait.  Interestingly, the Iranian employment of mines seems to have gone 
unnoticed by American planners.  Despite the acknowledgement of harassment mining as 
a viable means for Iran to confront the American presence in the Gulf, the attacks did not 
spur the Americans into deploying mine warfare units to the Persian Gulf prior to the 
commencement of convoy operations. 
By July the American flag had been hauled up the masts of eleven newly-named 
Kuwaiti-owned ships.  The American naval presence in the Persian Gulf had been 
boosted by three additional surface vessels as well as the deployment to the Indian Ocean 
of a surface action group built around the battleship USS Missouri (BB-63).  Armed with 
32 Tomahawk missiles and nine 16-inch guns, the American dreadnaught, in addition to a 
nearby aircraft carrier battlegroup, was a symbol of the power that could be brought to 
bear should Tehran be so bold as to aggressively challenge the Reagan Administration’s 
new Persian Gulf policy.222  The stage was set to determine the validity of American 
faith in the ability of the U.S. Navy to deter Iranian attacks.   
B. THE BRIDGETON INCIDENT 
The first American convoy operation commenced on July 22, 1987, when the 
440,000 DWT crude oil tanker Bridgeton and the 46,000 DWT LPG (Liquid Propane 
Gas) tanker Gas Prince got underway in the Gulf of Oman and set course for Kuwait.  
The two recent additions to the American merchant fleet were escorted by the cruiser 
USS Fox (CG-33) and the guided missile destroyer USS Kidd (DDG-993).  The small 
American convoy was supported by additional naval vessels positioned at the both ends 
of the Strait of Hormuz and off of Qatar.223  The USS Constellation (CV-64) battlegroup 
was stationed in the Gulf of Oman to provide aerial support.  Saudi and American 
AWACS aircraft provided additional airborne surveillance over the Persian Gulf. 
Following a safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, the convoy anchored off 
Bahrain during the evening of July 23.  On July 24, while underway approximately 20 
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miles west of Farsi Island, Bridgeton struck a moored mine.  The mine damaged two 
forward cargo tanks, but did not result in any personnel injuries and the ship proceeded 
under her own power for Kuwait, with the thin-skinned U.S. Navy combatants trailing 
behind in an attempt to avoid sharing Bridgeton’s fate.   
 Iran denied responsibility for the attack, claiming the “hand of God” had holed the 
tanker.224  In fact, Iran had sown at least sixty mines in three areas.225  Despite claims of 
non-complicity, the mining offered Tehran a propaganda victory over the United States, 
Prime Minister Hossein Mousavi gleefully classifying the attack as “an irreparable blow 
on America’s political and military prestige.”226  Despite earlier statements that the 
United States would attack any vessel caught laying mines, no retaliation was planned.  
The American decision to exercise restraint was influenced by the limited amount of 
damage incurred and the fact that the attack resulted in no casualties.227  
The mining of M.V. Bridgeton demonstrated American unpreparedness to combat 
the mine threat and, more importantly, exposed the fatuity of the assumption that Iran 
could be deterred from directly confronting the United States.  General Crist 
characterized Tehran’s boldness as “a distinct and serious change in Iranian policy vis-à-
vis U.S. military interests in the Persian Gulf” and that the attack demonstrated “in vivid 
contrast” a change in Iranian attitudes towards U.S. warships in the Gulf, which 
traditionally had been “treated circumspectly, almost deferentially by the Iranians.”228  
Admiral Bernsen later conceded that “deterrence would not succeed and the Iranian 
leadership had decided to take their chances by directly challenging the U.S.”229 
 The Bridgeton mining was viewed with sufficient concern in Washington as to 
suggest that, had a naval vessel been lost, the resultant outcry might have ended 
Operation Earnest Will after the first convoy.  This would have provided Tehran with a 
propaganda victory over the United States and would have reinforced regional 
perceptions of the United States as an undependable ally, a perception which the Reagan 
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Administration hoped Operation Earnest Will would destroy.  Earnest Will, once 
embarked upon, had created an independent interest in the continued credibility of the 
United States in the region. 
C. THE CAPTURE OF IRAN AJR 
Following the July 24 mining of M.V. Bridgeton Admiral Crowe ordered a halt to 
convoy operations until sufficient mine countermeasures platforms could be put into 
place.  The United States Navy was forced to activate several 1950s-vintage Aggressive 
class minesweepers from the reserve fleet.  As it would take time to tow the 30 year old 
wooden vessels from their stateside homeports to the Persian Gulf, an interim solution 
was required.230  Two KOTC-owned tugs, the Hunter and the ironically named Striker, 
were modified to perform as minesweepers.  Manned by crews of mixed nationalities and 
steaming at the head of a convoy, the two vessels could, in theory, clear a channel 270 
yards wide.231   
 Convoy operations resumed on August 1 when the LPG carrier Gas Prince 
departed Kuwait, escorted by the destroyer Kidd and frigate Crommelin (FFG-37).232  
Inbound convoy operations resumed on August 8, Kidd and Crommelin escorting the 
crude oil tankers Sea Isle City and Ocean City and the LPG carrier Gas King.  The 
American convoy sailed despite intelligence indicating an Iranian mine field, taking the 
precaution of forming up further south, a wise decision in light of the Panamanian-
flagged tanker Texaco Caribbean striking a mine off Fujayrah in the Gulf of Oman on 
August 10.233  The mining of Texaco Caribbean, which was under charter to a U.S. 
company, marked the first instance of mining outside the Persian Gulf.234  Five days later 
the Saudi-flagged oil field support vessel Anita sunk after striking a mine just outside the 
Strait of Hormuz. 
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 Iran’s mining of the waters in the Gulf of Oman inspired some previously 
reluctant West European countries to dispatch minesweeping vessels to the Persian Gulf.  
On August 11, London announced the deployment of four Hunt class minesweepers to 
the Gulf.235  Simultaneously, France announced the decision to deploy two minesweepers 
to the Gulf of Oman.236  These forces were augmented by two Dutch and two Belgian 
minesweepers on September 7 and 14, respectively.237  On September 9, Italy announced 
the deployment of 3 frigates, 3 minesweepers and 2 support ships to the Persian Gulf.238  
The Italian deployment was a direct response to a September 2 Pasdaran attack on the 
Italian-flagged cargo vessel Jolly Rubino.  On October 8, West Germany announced the 
deployment of three warships to the Mediterranean to replace vessels deployed by allied 
nations to the Persian Gulf.239  Once again, Tehran’s actions in the Persian Gulf were 
counterproductive, serving only to further isolate Iran from the rich nations of the West.  
 The next major confrontation occurred on the night of September 21, 1987.  Army 
special operations helicopters operating from USS Jarret (FFG-33) discovered the 
Iranian naval vessel Iran Ajr laying mines off Bahrain in an area used as an anchorage by 
Earnest Will convoys.  The American helicopters attacked the small vessel with machine 
gun fire, forcing the Iranian crew to jump overboard.  A United States Navy SEAL team 
boarded the vessel at first light and discovered nine mines on the vessel’s deck, as well as 
a logbook revealing areas where previous minefields had been set.240  Surviving Iranian 
crew members were repatriated and Iran Ajr was eventually scuttled.241 
The capture of Iran Ajr came at an inopportune time for Tehran.  Iranian 
President Khamenei was scheduled to address the United Nations General Assembly the 
next day to discuss the perceived mistreatment of Iran by the Security Council at the 
beginning of the war and to “convey Iran’s willingness to observe a cease-fire on the 
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basis of a modified version of Resolution 598.”242  By ordering Iran Ajr to sea, the 
Pasdaran openly contradicted the wishes of political leaders in Tehran.243  The Iran Ajr 
incident should have demonstrated to the Reagan Administration that the American 
military intervention in support of Kuwait served a valuable purpose to radical elements 
in Tehran that viewed vigorous prosecution of the war as more important than 
government efforts to negotiate a ceasefire and that deeper U.S. involvement would only 
serve to further strengthen the radical elements pushing for “continuous Jihad.”244  This 
reduced the chances for a negotiated settlement to the war and worked against keeping 
the American display of purposeful naval force limited. 
D. THE “BATTLE OF FARSI ISLAND” 
By late September American intelligence was alarmed by an Iranian build up of 
small craft on Farsi and Kharg Islands.  On September 30, intelligence indicated a 
potential Iranian small boat attack on Saudi and Kuwaiti offshore oil installations.245  On 
the night of October 3 a U.S. AWACS aircraft detected what was believed to be a 
formation of Iranian small craft on a course towards Kuwait.  Aircraft and vessels were 
dispatched to intercept the Iranians, who failed to complete their attack.  Many believe 
that the Iranian attack was a false alarm, the AWACS radar operators mistaking sea 
return as small attack craft.246  
In response to the Bridgeton mining the Kuwaitis provided a converted oil support 
barge (Hercules) for use as a stationary sea base to allow small craft, special forces and 
helicopters to patrol the shipping lanes west of Farsi Island.  On the night of October 8, 
1987, Hercules conducted her first mission.  Army special operations helicopters, 
reconnoitering an area off Farsi in which American small craft were to establish a 
listening post, were startled to discover three Iranian patrol craft present.  The Iranians 
took the Army helicopters under fire unsuccessfully and were destroyed when the aircraft 
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returned fire.  American surface craft retrieved six Iranian survivors from the water, two 
of which later died from their wounds.247  A short time later, twenty to forty small craft 
were detected heading towards Hercules.  The Americans prepared for further action, but 
the Iranians small craft turned away.  There is some doubt as to the existence of this large 
Iraqi formation.  While several sources contend that the Iranian formation was real and 
retreated after the loss of three small craft, the Commanding Officer of USS Thach (FFG-
43) believed the Iranian small craft did not exist but were a radar anomaly.248 
E. OPERATION NIMBLE ARCHER 
By the autumn of 1987, the Iran – Iraq War steadily marched closer to Kuwait.  
Throughout the spring and summer Iran moved Silkworm missile batteries onto the Al 
Faw peninsula into a position to threaten Kuwait.  On September 2, a Silkworm missile 
was fired at the Emirate but landed in the Persian Gulf just off the Kuwaiti Coast.249  On 
September 4, a second Silkworm was fired at Kuwait, striking an uninhabited beach area 
two miles south of an oil loading terminal.250  The Emirate responded by expelling five 
Iranian diplomats in protest of Tehran’s aggression.  On October 15, a Silkworm missile 
struck the American-owned Liberian-flagged tanker Sungari.  The 275,000 DWT vessel 
suffered extensive damage and was later declared a CTL.251 
The following day, the reflagged Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City was struck by a 
Silkworm missile, ironically while the American vessel was observing the stricken 
Sungari. Unlike the Bridgeton incident, the United States decided to respond to the 
Iranian attack.  Rather than strike the Silkworm sites that threatened Kuwait and carried 
out the attack on Sea Isle City the United States chose to target the Iranian Rashadat oil 
platforms in the northern Persian Gulf.  The platforms were no longer active as an oil 
production facility, but were being used as a staging area for Pasdaran attacks and as a 
surveillance platform reporting American ship movements. 
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Operation Nimble Archer commenced on October 19.  A six ship surface action 
group commenced the operation by warning the platforms’ Iranian occupants to abandon 
the platform, all of whom quickly complied.  The American vessels then commenced 
shelling.  One platform quickly caught fire, but the second remained standing after nearly 
1,000 rounds had been fired at it.252  Eventually the stubborn platform was destroyed by a 
U.S. Navy SEAL team.  No lives were lost by either side during the operation.   
The Reagan Administration explained that Operation Nimble Archer was 
undertaken in accordance with America's “inherent right of self defense, as recognized by 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.”253  Tehran, not surprisingly, took a different 
view, declaring that the United States “had opened an all out war” against Iran.254  
Operation Nimble Archer marked the first time the United States directly retaliated for an 
attack against an American flag vessel during Operation Earnest Will.  Following the 
action, secretary of Defense Weinberger declared that the United States “now considered 
the matter closed.”255 
F. THE MINING OF USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS 
Iran was not cowed by Operation Nimble Archer.  On October 22, a Silkworm 
missile fired from the Al Faw peninsula damaged the Sea Island Oil Terminal, 
responsible for a third of Kuwait’s oil exporting capacity.256  On December 7, a 
Silkworm fired at Kuwait was diverted by a radar decoy barge which was deployed to 
help defend against missile attacks. Additionally, Tehran reinvigorated its anti-ship 
campaign, conducting 27 attacks resulting in one vessel being sunk and two declared 
CTLs in November and December. 
The United States Navy remained busy during November and December of 1987, 
escorting 27 merchant vessels in eight convoys without interference from Iran or Iraq.  A 
minor tragedy occurred on November 1, when sailors on the frigate USS Carr (FFG-52) 
fired on a dhow that approached a vessel of the Military Sealift Command too closely in 
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the Strait of Hormuz, killing an Indian fisherman.257  On December 12, a U.S. Navy 
helicopter rescued 11 seamen from the 232,000 DWT Cypriot-flagged tanker Pivot, 
which had been struck by a Pasdaran rocket.  A repeat of the Stark incident was avoided 
on February 12, when two Iraqi missiles were fired at the guided missile destroyer USS 
Chandler (DDG-996).258  Fortunately, both missiles missed. 
Month Number of Convoys Number of Ships Escorted 
July 1 2 
August 5 13 
September 4 9 
October 4 8 
November 5 16 
December 3 11 
Totals 22 59 
Table 5.   Earnest Will Convoys, 1987 (From:  O’Rourke, Gulf Ops)259 
 
The war in the Persian Gulf continued into 1988.  The Iraqi air force pounded 
shipping servicing Iran’s oil industry, sinking four vessels and damaging five beyond 
repair, including the 564,000 DWT tanker Seawise Giant.  The Iranians responded with a 
mixture of Pasdaran and frigate attacks resulting in one vessel being sunk and two 
declared CTLs.  The Iranians concentrated on unescorted vessels, with ships flying the 
flags of Greece, Denmark, Norway and Spain being the most frequent victims.260  Most 
Iranian attacks during this period occurred off the UAE and in the waters surrounding the 
Strait of Hormuz.261 
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 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June  July Aug Total 
Iraq 8 6 6 0 13 3 4 0 40 
Iran 8 5 13 7 5 3 5 1 47 
Table 6.   Frequency of Shipping Attacks, 1988 (From:  Navias and Hooton,  Tanker 
Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During the Iran – Iraq Crisis 1980 
– 1988) 262 
 
In February, Rear Admiral Anthony Less assumed command over the American 
Naval Forces in the Persian Gulf.  In March, Less instituted a more aggressive strategy 
designed to “get in the face of the Iranians” and convince Tehran to halt its attacks on 
neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf.263  After months of witnessing Iranian attacks on 
non-U.S. flagged shipping, American naval officers were frustrated with having to stand 
idly by while innocent vessels were struck.264  While official U.S. policy remained 
limited to the protection of American-flagged vessels, Less wanted his Captains to 
“explore the gray area between shooting and standing idly” by as Iran attacked neutral 
vessels.265  Rear Admiral Less’s proactive strategy directed American war ships to 
shadow Iranian vessels in order to preclude attacks on neutral ships or the laying of 
minefields.266  Less ordered his commanders to intimidate their Iranian counterparts from 
interfering with neutral shipping by aggressively maneuvering their vessels in an attempt 
to force the Iranians to back down.  Several of these cat and mouse episodes lasted hours, 
and produced some close calls.   
The frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) departed her homeport of Newport, 
Rhode Island and arrived in the Persian Gulf on February 14, 1988.  Samuel B. Roberts 
immediately joined with USS Chandler and two reflagged tankers, the Gas Princess and 
Townsend for the eleventh inbound convoy of 1988.267  Commanded by Commander 
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Paul X. Rinn, Samuel B. Roberts enjoyed a well-earned reputation for excellence.  Rinn 
was an aggressive officer, who looked forward to working within the gray areas 
described by Rear Admiral Less.268  He had earlier engaged in a three hour jousting 
match with the Iranian frigate Alvand following the escort of convoy 11 to Kuwait.  Rinn 
believed that the Iranian frigate was positioning itself to attack the Greek tanker Tandis 
and was very happy to have driven the Alvand off, later writing to his brother: “crew on a 
high – captain’s got balls!”269   
Month Number of Convoys Number of Ships Escorted 
January 7 16 
February 7 18 
March 6 10 
April 7 18 
May 6 14 
June 10 16 
July 8 13 
August 10 17 
September 7 17 
October 10 19 
November 12 22 
December 15 20 
Totals 105 200 
Table 7.   Earnest Will Convoys, 1988 (From: O’Rourke, Gulf Ops)270 
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Commander Rinn’s aggressive behavior continued in late February, during 
encounters with the Alvand and the frigate Sahand, and again on March 1 when he 
prevented the Sahand from boarding a merchant vessel that was registered in the Iraqi 
port of Basra.271  With this act, Rinn technically exceeded his authority by interfering (as 
a neutral vessel) with Iran’s belligerent right to board and search merchant vessels.272  
Rear Admiral Less’s strategy of using his vessels to aggressively interfere with Iranian 
naval operations worked against the American naval involvement remaining limited and 
was pregnant with the danger of the situation escalating into war, always a possibility 
when purposeful force gunboat diplomacy is employed.273  By actively interfering with 
Iranian maritime operations, Tehran could have easily viewed the Americans as 
supporting Iraq’s war effort and been blinded to the subtleties of “purposeful” force, 
making increased confrontation with the United States more likely, and decreasing the 
chances that the American use of force would remain limited. 
On April 14, 1988, USS Samuel B. Roberts was steaming south through the 
Persian Gulf towards a scheduled rendezvous with the USS San Jose (AFS-7).  Shortly 
before 1639 local time three black objects were observed by the frigate’s bow lookout, 
who immediately informed the bridge.274  Captain Rinn was backing his ship away from 
the floating mines when, at 1650, USS Samuel B. Roberts was rocked by an explosion on 
its port side near the helicopter hanger.  The blast broke the keel of the American frigate, 
nearly tearing the ship in half, and started fires.  Miraculously, no one was killed, 
although ten sailors were injured.275  Superhuman efforts by the ship’s crew, which had 
previously received an award for exceptional damage control, saved the vessel.  The 
American frigate eventually reached Dubai, and would later be transported to the United 
States by a heavy lift vessel.  The ship was eventually repaired and returned to service.   
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A mixed-nationality minesweeping force converged on the area where Samuel B. 
Roberts was hit and discovered eight additional mines.276  Upon inspection, it was 
revealed that the mines bore similar markings to those that had been captured onboard 
Iran Ajr in September 1987, and that the lack of marine growth on the weapons indicated 
that they had recently been sown by Iran.277  This field had been laid by the Pasdaran, 
against the wishes of the Iranian Navy, who had made an effort to sweep them prior to 
Samuel B. Roberts being hit.278  This fact is illustrative of the conflicting agendas of the 
various factions within the Iranian revolutionary movement, and highlights the failure of 
the Americans to realistically evaluate Tehran’s ability to perceive and respond 
consistently to a deterrent strategy.  The limited effectiveness of Iran’s administrative 
authority worked against Iran’s acceptance of Operation Earnest Will. 
G. WAR AT SEA: OPERATION PRAYING MANTIS 
Retaliation for the mining of USS Samuel B. Roberts was discussed in 
Washington, Bahrain and Tampa, headquarters of CENTCOM.  In Washington, the State 
Department stressed that any retaliation should remain “proportionate.”279  Admiral 
Crowe pushed for the destruction of “targets of military significance” that would degrade 
Tehran’s ability to interfere with American shipping.280  The Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff proposed the destruction of an Iranian warship as a signal to Tehran that 
the United States was “willing to exact a serious price” for continued attacks on 
American vessels.281  Admiral Crowe went so far as to designate the ship to be destroyed.  
The Iranian frigate Sabalan had developed a reputation for cold-bloodedness; its 
commander being termed Captain Nasty for his habit of machine-gunning the living 
quarters of merchant vessels.282  General Crist recommended striking targets which 
allowed the Iranians to monitor American convoys, proposing to destroy “dual use” oil 
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platforms used to support Pasdaran activities, later explaining “I wanted to take their eyes 
out.”283  Admiral Less proposed strikes by aircraft and Tomahawk missiles against 
targets at the Bandar Abbas naval base.284   National Command Authority sided with 
General Crist by designating two oil platforms in the Sirri and Sassan oil fields as targets.  
Admiral Crowe still specified the destruction of an Iranian warship, personally telling 
Admiral Less to “sink the Sabalan, put it on the bottom.”285 
By the morning of April 18, preparations for the American strike, now known as 
Operation Praying Mantis, were complete.  Admiral Less divided his force into three 
surface action groups (SAG), each comprised of three ships.  SAG Bravo was assigned 
the mission of destroying the Sassan oil platform while SAG Charlie would shell the Sirri 
Platform.  SAG Delta would patrol off Bandar Abbas and pounce on any Iranian 
warships that attempted to interfere with the operation.  An aircraft carrier battlegroup 
centered on USS Enterprise (CVN-65) was on station in the Gulf of Oman to provide air 
cover.  These aircraft received additional support from Saudi-based AWACS and tanker 
aircraft.286 
By 0600 on April 18, the ships of SAG Bravo were ready to commence the 
destruction of the Sassan oil platform.287  Warnings were broadcast in English, Arabic 
and Farsi instructing Iranian personnel to abandon the platform.  Approximately 30 
Iranians fled, but several remained behind.  The large oil platform was taken under fire 
by the American warships and Marine Corps Cobra helicopters.  Fire was halted when 
the remaining Iranian crew members were observed abandoning the structure, only to 
resume when they were clear.  A Marine Corps assault team was airlifted from USS 
Trenton to the platform, which was declared secure at 1005.288  The Marines planted 
1300 pounds of explosives which further damaged the Iranian structure. 
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SAG Charlie struck the Sirri platform simultaneously with SAG Bravo’s attack on 
Sassan.289  Warnings to evacuate the platform were issued, and as on the Sassan 
platform, not all the Iranian crewmen complied.  The American ships opened fire at 0815, 
setting the platform on fire.  At 1048 the Iranian frigate Joshan was detected as it 
approached the Sirri oil field.290  USS Wainwright (CG-28) warned the Iranian frigate to 
leave the area three times.   Joshan refused to comply and launched a Harpoon missile at 
the American cruiser.  The missile passed by the American cruiser with a whoosh, so 
close that the men on the bridge could feel the heat from the missile’s burning rocket 
propellant, and landed in the water 75 yards off the ship’s stern.291  SAG Charlie 
responded with at least six SM-1 missiles and one Harpoon, all but the Harpoon striking 
the hapless Iranian frigate.292  SAG Charlie then finished off Joshan with gunfire.  
Shortly after, Wainwright took an Iranian F-4 fighter under fire, damaging its wing with a 
surface-to-air missile. 
The battle spread to other parts of the Persian Gulf.  In the southern Gulf, a 
formation of Pasdaran small craft attacked targets in the Mubarek oil fields, striking 
several ships, including the American-flagged oil field support vessel Willi Tide.  The 
Iranian small craft were attacked by Enterprise-based A-6 Intruder attack aircraft, which 
sunk one vessel.  The remaining Pasdaran craft fled to Abu Musa Island.  Shortly 
thereafter, U.S. aircraft detected the Iranian frigate Sahand, sister ship of the much-
despised Sabalan.  The Iranian frigate unsuccessfully took the American aircraft under 
fire and was in turn destroyed by a combination of bomb and Harpoon missile strikes.  
Sahand sunk following the detonation of its magazine, taking most of its 135-man crew 
to the bottom of the Persian Gulf.293  Later in the afternoon, another A-6 discovered the 
hated Sabalan off Bandar Abbas.  The Iranian frigate fired on the American jet, which 
retaliated with a bomb that was dropped down the vessel’s smoke stack.  Sabalan was 
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dead in the water as SAG Delta and an additional air strike closed on the helpless vessel.  
Washington called back the strikes, Admiral Crowe explaining to Secretary of Defense 
Carlucci "we’ve shed enough blood today.”294  
Operation Praying Mantis was the largest surface action fought by the U.S. Navy 
since the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944.  Iranian losses totaled three oil platforms heavily 
damaged, six surface vessels, including a frigate, sunk and another frigate very heavily 
damaged.  An unknown number of Iranians were killed.  The United States lost one AH-
1T attack helicopter and its two-man crew.295  The heavy losses incurred by the Iranian 
Navy on April 18 corresponded with a turn for the worse in the ground war against Iraq.  
On the same day, Iraqi forces recaptured the Al Faw Peninsula.  Over the course of the 
spring and summer Iranian troops were continuously pushed back by the Iraqi army, 
which reentered Iranian territory for the first time since 1982 on July 13. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Despite American overconfidence in the ability to deter Iran, the first nine months 
of Operation Earnest Will could be declared a success.  While 1987, and the first four 
months of 1988, witnessed the most sustained Iranian assault on Gulf shipping during the 
Iran – Iraq war296, the Americans had largely succeeded in preventing attacks on 
Kuwaiti-owned American-flagged tankers.  While Iran was dissuaded from attacking 
American flagged shipping trading with Kuwait, Tehran compensated by attacking 
vessels flying other neutral flags that were trading with Kuwait and other GCC countries.  
These attacks served to further isolate Iran from the West, as Great Britain, France and 
other European nations deployed naval forces to the Persian Gulf to defend merchant 
vessels flying their respective flags.  Additionally, the threat of increased Soviet presence 
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in the gulf had been contained while moderate GCC states were increasingly cooperative 
with the United States. 
The decision by Rear Admiral Less to institute an aggressive naval posture, 
however, set the United States on course towards becoming more deeply involved in the 
Iran – Iraq War, and set in motion an escalatory dynamic that threatened to alter the basic 
nature of the American operation.  On April 29, 1988, Operation Earnest Will entered a 
new phase of open-ended intervention, albeit still under the guise of legal neutrality, , 
when the United States declared that it would extend the U.S. Navy’s protective umbrella 
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VI. AMERICAN ESCALATION AND THE VINCENNES 
INCIDENT 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
On April 29, 1988, eleven days after Operation Praying Mantis, Secretary of 
Defense Frank C. Carlucci announced that the United States Navy would provide distress 
assistance to all “friendly, innocent neutral vessels flying a nonbelligerent flag outside 
declared exclusion zones, that are not carrying contraband or resisting legitimate visit and 
search by a Persian Gulf belligerent.”297  As Iran was the only belligerent conducting 
attacks outside of declared exclusion zones at that time, the policy change represented a 
further tilt towards Iraq.  While once again declaring a policy of “strict neutrality,” 
Secretary of Defense Carlucci stated, “We are not the policeman of the Gulf, nor do we 
wish to be.  We cannot stand by and watch innocent people be killed or maimed by 
malicious, lawless actions when we have the means to assist and perhaps prevent 
them.”298  This policy decision set the United States on a course towards increased 
confrontation with Iran and was responsible for the worst tragedy of the American 
involvement in the Iran – Iraq war. 
American expansion of the protection scheme occurred despite the fact that 
Iranian attacks on neutral shipping decreased in the aftermath of Operation Praying 
Mantis.  Two vessels were struck in the week following the April 18 U.S. – Iranian clash 
in the Persian Gulf.  The Pasdaran struck five times in May, resulting in the Maltese bulk 
carrier Don Miguel being declared a CTL on May 27.299  Pasdaran activity declined even 
further in June, which witnessed a mere three Iranian attacks. 
Operation Praying Mantis also coincided with a turn for the worse in the ground 
war for Iran.  On the night of April 17, the Iraqi VII Army Corps and units from the 
Republican Guard secured the Al Faw peninsula following a 36 hour battle.300  Iraqi 
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forces recaptured Manjun Island on June 25 and had succeeded in expelling all Iranian 
forces from southern Iraq by June 26.  There is no question that Carlucci’s announcement 
came at a time when the fortunes of were turning broadly against Iran. 
B. DEEPENING U.S. INVOLVEMENT 
1. U.S. Objectives 
The decision to expand the protection scheme was designed to “add a turn to the 
ever tightening screw on Iran’s military.”301  Similar ideas had been proposed as early as 
summer 1987, but were opposed by Secretary of Defense Weinberger and General Crist, 
commander of CENTCOM.302  In the wake of the success of Praying Mantis and the 
Iraqi victories on the battlefield, the idea to expand the scheme was forwarded to 
Secretary of Defense by Admiral Crowe in an effort to increase military pressure on 
Tehran.303  Carlucci was predisposed in any case to extending the Navy’s protective 
umbrella to all neutral shipping. The feeling within the Reagan Administration was that 
the combination of the April 18 Iraqi offensive and the losses suffered during Operation 
Praying Mantis would be the last nail in Iran’s coffin, pushing Tehran towards accepting 
a ceasefire. 
2. Gunboat Diplomacy Revisited 
James Cable has proposed that, the closer purposeful force “can be related to the 
actual cause of the dispute, the more likely it is to achieve its objective while remaining 
limited in character.”304  Operation Earnest Will was initially conceived as “a limited 
response to a very real threat” and was not designed to constitute “an open-ended 
unilateral commitment to defend all non-belligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf.”305  
Through the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers, the United States sought to deter Iran’s 
attacks on the Emirate’s shipping, and by doing so, demonstrate support for moderate 
Gulf states against Iranian pressure.306  These were limited objectives that had been 
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largely achieved by April 1988.  Given the low number of attacks on American-flagged 
shipping during the first nine months of Operation Earnest Will, these limited objectives 
appear to have been tolerable to Tehran.  However, by expanding the protection scheme, 
American policy became divorced from the initial cause of its involvement in Operation 
Earnest Will, attacks on Kuwaiti shipping.  The new American policy “lowered the 
threshold of crisis,”307 and with the setbacks on the battlefield in the spring of 1988, was 
bound to be considered intolerable by Tehran.  This fact increased the danger of the 
United States becoming more directly involved in the war, a major danger when utilizing 
purposeful force.308 
 Limited naval force, to continue with Cable’s analysis, “should possess a definite 
purpose, of which the extent is apparent to both sides.”309  In contrast to the first nine 
months of Operation Earnest Will, when American policy objectives centered on the 
protection of American-flagged vessels, the new American policy was neither defined nor 
limited.  Success for the new American policy required a halt to all Iranian attacks on 
shipping, which would have allowed Saddam Hussein to continue Iraq’s anti-shipping 
campaign without fear of concomitant attacks on vessels supporting Iraqi allies.  Thus, 
expanding the protection scheme to all neutral shipping effectively served the Iraqi war 
effort and worked against American claims of neutrality.  This could only have reinforced 
Iranian perceptions that the United States was now a belligerent in the Iran – Iraq War, a 
factor which worked against the American use of force remaining limited. Henceforth, 
the level of American involvement in the Iran – Iraq War would depend, for practical 
purposes, on the discretion of individual Pasdaran commanders, a group described by 
former Secretary of Defense Weinberger as “lunatics” and “pirates.”310 
 It was in the course of engaging Pasdaran forces that the culminating tragedy of 
America’s intervention in the Iran-Iraq War would occur. On July 3, 1988, American 
warships, responding to reports of Pasdaran small craft menacing neutral shipping, 
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became embroiled in a small-scale surface action with several Iranian vessels. This action 
would not have occurred under the original limited Earnest Will protection scheme, and it 
ended when the USS Vincennes (CG-49) mistakenly shot down an Iranian airliner, killing 
290 people.        
C. THE VINCENNES DISASTER 
The Vincennes was a Ticonderoga-class AEGIS cruiser, dispatched to the Gulf to 
compensate for the lack of airborne AWACS coverage, which hampered American 
efforts to monitor the southern Persian Gulf during the first ten months of Operation 
Earnest Will.  The United Arab Emirates refused to grant American E-3 AWACS aircraft 
overflight rights and carrier-based E-2C AWACS aircraft were flight-hour limited due to 
the emergence of stress cracks in the aging aircraft’s wings.311  The deployment of 
several P-3 aircraft to Bahrain enhanced the American capability to monitor the southern 
Persian Gulf, but a gap in radar coverage in the Strait of Hormuz remained 
nevertheless.312 
The Department of Defense considered deploying an AEGIS cruiser as a means to 
extend American coverage over the entire Persian Gulf as early as September 1987.313  
This suggestion was met with great resistance by the U.S. Navy, as most officers were 
loath to deploy the preeminent “blue water” anti-air platform to the “pigsty” of the 
Persian Gulf-- high-value AEGIS ship being a vulnerable to mine damage as any other 
kind.314  However, uncertainty over Iranian response to Operation Praying Mantis, 
coupled with the construction of additional Silkworm missile sites in positions 
threatening traffic in the Strait of Hormuz tipped the balance in favoring of sending the 
Vincennes to the Gulf.315 
The Vincennes, under the command of Captain Will Rogers, was engaged in a 
fleet exercise on April 20, 1988, when it was ordered to return to her homeport in San 
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Diego and deploy to the Persian Gulf the following day.316  Vincennes had completed a 
myriad of naval exercises in the six months prior to her deployment and was considered 
to be in an excellent state of readiness.317  These exercises included simulated Earnest 
Will convoy missions, anti-Silkworm missile training, and anti-terrorism training.  
Following four additional days to allow for additional preparations for the short-notice 
deployment, Vincennes departed San Diego on April 25 and arrived at the Subic Bay 
training area in the Philippines on May 10.  USS Vincennes underwent four additional 
days of intense training in the Philippines prior to continuing her voyage to the Persian 
Gulf.  Additionally, Captain Rogers and his officers and crew were subjected to two 
weeks of Rules of Engagement Exercises tailored to the Persian Gulf ROE.  The 
American cruiser transited the Strait of Hormuz during the evening of May 27 and 
arrived in Sitrah, Bahrain on May 29.318 
Captain Rogers met with Rear Admiral Less on May 29 to discuss the manner in 
which his ship was to be employed.  Rear Admiral Less expressed his pleasure in having 
the Vincennes’s capabilities in the Persian Gulf and emphasized that Captain Roger’s 
short-notice deployment resulted from high-level decisions.319  The American Admiral 
characterized the Silkworm threat as “real, but only a possibility” and that the Iranians 
had not done more than “move some dirt around possible launch sites.”  Less was 
primarily concerned with the poor state of the information flow from the Persian Gulf to 
his command ship, USS Coronado (AGF-11).  Captain Rogers was directed to rectify this 
problem, Less explaining that he needed a tough manager and that Rogers would “not 
make any friends.”  Rogers’s management of the information flow, couple with his 
aggressiveness320 would soon result in Vincennes being given the nickname 
“Robocruiser” by other American warships in the Persian Gulf.321 
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Captain Rogers commenced his first patrol in the Strait of Hormuz Western Patrol 
Area (SOHWPA) on June 1.  On June 2, Vincennes monitored an Iranian frigate 
conducting a boarding of the bulk carrier Vevey, during which Rogers may have 
displayed over aggressiveness by menacing the Iranian frigate.322  The American cruiser 
spent the remainder of June on patrol in the central and southern Persian Gulf, with brief 
stops in Bahrain between patrol periods.323  On July 2, Vincennes escorted the heavy lift 
vessel Mighty Servant II through the Strait of Hormuz.  Mighty Servant II was 
transporting the mine-damaged Samuel B Roberts back to the United States for repairs. 
On July 2, 1988, the Danish-flagged merchant vessel Karama Maersk radioed a 
distress message following an attack by several Pasdaran craft 20 miles southwest of Abu 
Musa Island.  The frigate USS Elmer Montgomery (FF-1082) responded to the distress 
call – the first time a U.S. Naval combatant provided distress assistance to a vessel flying 
a foreign flag in support of the expanded American commitment in the Persian Gulf.  The 
Iranian attack did not badly damage the Danish vessel and no crew members were 
injured.  Arriving on the scene, the American frigate observed at least three small craft 
fire rockets at Karama Maersk.324  USS Elmer Montgomery dispersed the small craft 
with a warning shot from her five inch gun.  The Pasdaran craft fled to the northwest, 
ending the brief surface action. 
USS Elmer Montgomery went into action again on July 3.  At 0630 the American 
frigate observed seven Pasdaran small craft approaching a merchant vessel near the Strait 
of Hormuz.325  Shortly thereafter, 13 Pasdaran craft in three groups were observed, one 
group of four small craft assuming position on Elmer Montgomery’s port quarter.326  The 
Iranian small craft queried several merchant vessels on VHF radio, but made no attacks.  
USS Vincennes was proceeding to a scheduled port visit in Bahrain following the Mighty 
Servant II/Samuel B Roberts escort mission at this time. 
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At 0711, Elmer Montgomery heard five to seven explosions, source unknown, 
emanating from the north.   No merchant vessels requested assistance.  At 0712, 
Vincennes was ordered to proceed north to Elmer Montgomery’s position to monitor 
Pasdaran activity.327  Additionally, the cruiser’s embarked LAMPS helicopter was 
ordered to monitor the Iranian small craft.  At 0749 the helicopter reported that four 
Pasdaran craft were approaching a merchant vessel.  At 0818, Captain Rogers ordered his 
crew to their battle stations (general quarters).  The Iranian small craft eventually stood 
down following a warning from an Omani patrol craft and Captain Rogers asked for 
permission to resume his course for Bahrain and secured from general quarters at 
0846.328  Rogers’s LAMPS helicopter remained behind to monitor the Pasdaran craft. 
At 0915, Vincennes’s helicopter reported being fired on by a group of Pasdaran 
craft, the aircrew observing “several small flashes and puffs of smoke approximately 100 
yards from the helo.”329  In order for the Iranian small arms fire to pass this close to the 
American helicopter, its aircrew either accidentally or intentionally flew much closer than 
the four mile limit imposed by American ROE.  Captain Rogers ordered his crew to their 
battle stations and started to close the helicopter’s position at high speed.  The helicopter 
crew relayed the position of the Pasdaran craft that had fired at them via secure data link, 
and at 0920 captain Rogers was directed to assume tactical control of Elmer Montgomery. 
The Rules of Engagement (ROE) in place on July 3, 1988, emphasized the 
responsibility of Commanding Officers to defend their ships from attack.330  Pursuit of 
hostile forces was permitted if “initiated in response to, and in defense against the hostile 
acts or hostile intent of such forces.  Pursuit will be terminated when the hostile force no 
linger poses a threat.”331  American ships and aircraft were allowed to enter Iranian 
territorial waters in defense against hostile acts or hostile intent demonstrated by Iranian 
forces.  However, pursuit was to be terminated “when the hostile force no longer poses an 
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immediate threat.”332  The ROE required commanders to positively identify all unknown 
air contacts prior to designating them hostile and engaging, unless the unknown contact is 
displaying hostile intent or actually committing a hostile act.  The ROE provided several 
methods to warn off aircraft in the event that radio warnings went unheeded.333  
However, the ROE emphasized the Captain’s duty to defend his vessel: “If a potentially 
hostile contact persists in closing after you warn him away and if, in your judgment, the 
threat of attack is imminent, it is an inherent right and responsibility to act in self-
defense.  We do not want, nor intend, to absorb a first attack (emphasis added).”334 
At 0939, Captain Rogers requested permission from Rear Admiral Less to engage 
the Iranian small craft.  Captain Rogers felt justified in taking the small craft under fire, 
as they had committed a hostile act by firing at Vincennes’s LAMPS helicopter and he 
perceived the Pasdaran craft to be a threat to his ship because they appeared to be closing 
Vincennes’s position.335  Less requested that Rogers verify that the Iranian craft were not 
leaving the immediate area of USS Vincennes.  Upon receiving word that the Pasdaran 
craft were closing with the American cruiser, Less granted Rogers permission to open fire 
at 0941. 
USS Vincennes and USS Elmer Montgomery commenced firing at 0943.  During 
the course of the 24 minute surface engagement, the two American warships crossed into 
Iranian territorial waters.  At 0947, an Airbus A300 passenger aircraft took off from a 
joint military and civilian airfield at Bandar Abbas, Iran.  The aircraft was immediately 
detected by Vincennes’s SPY-1 radar at an altitude of 900 feet and a range of 47 miles 
from the ongoing surface battle.  As the radar track moved over the Persian Gulf, it was 
designated as “Unknown-Assumed Enemy,” standard operating procedure whenever 
Iranian aircraft were detected.336  An American frigate entering the Persian Gulf, USS 
Sides (FFG-14) made radar contact on the Iranian airliner at 0948.  Despite the fact that 
the Iranian aircraft was transmitting a transponder code and maneuvering in a manner 
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appropriate for a civilian aircraft, a series of errors in Vincennes’s Combat Information 
Center (CIC) resulted in the aircraft being misidentified as an American-built F-14 
fighter, several of which had been sold to the Shah in the 1970s.  Tragically, the aircraft’s 
course took the A300 right over the top of the American cruiser.   
At 0951, Captain Rogers was ordered to take tactical control of USS Sides, which 
was also closely monitoring the Iranian air contact.  Captain Rogers informed Admiral 
Less that he intended to engage the Iranian aircraft when it reached a range of twenty 
miles.  Less ordered Rogers to attempt to warn the aircraft away prior to firing.  Between 
0949 and 0953, the two American warships (Vincennes and Sides) transmitted nine radio 
warnings to the Iranian aircraft, none of which were acknowledged.  At 0952, the Iranian 
aircraft was 22 nautical miles away from Vincennes at an altitude of 9200 feet.337  At 
about this same time, crewmen in Vincennes’s CIC erroneously reported, due to a series 
of mistakes, that the air contact was descending and accelerating.  No such confusion 
existed in USS Sides’s CIC, but the American frigate failed to radio Captain Rogers its 
assessment of the Iranian air contact, a critical error.  Despite his announced intent to fire 
at the Iranian aircraft at twenty miles, Rogers held fire in the hope that the aircraft would 
turn away. 
At 0954, the Iranian Airbus was 12 nautical miles from Vincennes at an altitude of 
12,370 feet.  However, Vincennes’s CIC watch standers remained convinced that the 
aircraft was descending from 7800 feet.338  Captain Rogers believed that he could wait no 
longer, and at 0954 and 22 seconds, at a range of ten miles, two SM-2 missiles were 
launched, both of which struck the Iranian airliner, killing all 290 passengers and crew 
members.  Vincennes and Elmer Montgomery halted their battle with the Pasdaran 
surface craft at 1003, having expended 119 rounds of five inch ammunition.339 
While the direct cause of the Iran Air 655 disaster was human error, the 
foundation for this tragedy was laid on April 29 with the announcement that the United 
States would provide distress assistance to all neutral shipping.  The new policy 
guaranteed increased, and increasingly hostile, contact between Iranian and American 
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forces, driving the Reagan Administration’s use of gunboat diplomacy across the line 
separating limited naval force and open warfare.  By assuming a more aggressive posture 
towards Iranian naval units, the United States ceased being a neutral party in the Iran – 
Iraq War. 
The Iran – Iraq war ended when Iran unconditionally accepted the provisions put 
forth in United Nations Security Council Resolution 598.  Ironically, the Iran Air 655 
tragedy provided the Iranian government the political cover required to accept a cease 
fire.  On July 17, 1988, Iranian President Khameini wrote the U.N. Secretary General, 
“We have decided to declare officially that the Islamic Republic of Iran – because of the 
importance it attaches to saving the lives of human beings and the establishment of 
justices and regional and international peace and security – accepts U.N. Resolution 
598.”340  
D. CONCLUSION 
When the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq went into effect in August 1988, the 
United States had achieved all of the strategic, political and economic objectives that 
spurred the Reagan Administration’s decision to protect Kuwaiti-owned shipping: the 
Soviet Union was denied further influence in the Persian Gulf; the United States had 
proven to be a dependable ally to GCC countries; an Iranian victory over Iraq was 
prevented; and the flow of Gulf oil had been protected.  However, the “success” of 
Operation Earnest Will has masked errors which could imperil future examples of 
American gunboat diplomacy. 
 Thomas L. McNaugher attributed much of the American success in Operation 
Earnest Will to luck.341  In order for future applications of gunboat diplomacy to be 
successful, it is vital that American strategists understand that the success of Operation 
Earnest Will occurred in spite of flawed assumptions concerning the ability of the U.S. 
Navy to deter Iran and that these complacent assumptions endangered the position of the 
United States in the Persian Gulf.  The United States was fortunate that its failure to 
adequately examine the factors that influenced Iran’s decision to accept or dispute the 
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provocative American policy did not result in the United States becoming more deeply 
involved in the Iran – Iraq war.  If a U.S. warship had been mined on July 24, 1987, in 
lieu of M.V. Bridgeton, the loss of an American warship and personnel, coming so 
closely on the heels of the Stark incident, could have ended the Reagan Administration’s 
new policy.  Had USS Samuel B. Roberts been sunk on April 14, 1988, or if USS 
Vincennes or Elmer Montgomery had been damaged by Iranian Silkworm missiles after 
entering Iranian territorial waters on July 3, the United States might well have responded 
by launching air strikes against the Iranian mainland.  Iran’s July 17, 1988, decision to 
accept UNSCR 598 was fortunate for the United States in that it precluded additional 
Iranian – American naval clashes , whose escalatory potential is all too apparent from 
sequence of events that led to the Vincennes disaster.     
American policy in the Persian Gulf was greatly aided by Tehran’s amazing 
capacity for self-destructive behavior. Iran stubbornly persisted in attacking neutral 
shipping even though Tehran’s campaign in the Persian Gulf had no effect on the Iraqi 
war effort. Iran’s attacks on Western European shipping resulted in a multinational 
armada being dispatched to the Persian Gulf to defend against Pasdaran attacks, further 
isolating Tehran from the West.  Finally, attacks on “moderate” Persian Gulf countries 
isolated Iran from its neighbors to the point that no Arab country other than Syria 
condemned the United States for destroying Iran Air 655.  As the current situation in Iraq 
illustrates, however, the United States cannot always be certain that its policies will enjoy 
the support of the world, or that America’s political opponents will engage in self-
defeating behavior.  If gunboat diplomacy is to remain a viable foreign policy option for 
the United States, it is vital that the negative lessons from Operation Earnest Will be 
understood.  Everyone’s luck runs out eventually, and on that day the best remedy for 
misfortune will be a clear, and appropriately modest, appreciation of what the limited use 
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